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Performative Privacy
Scott Skinner-Thompson*
Broadly speaking, privacy doctrine suggests that the right to privacy is
non-existent once one enters the public realm. Although some scholars
contend that privacy ought to exist in public, “public privacy” has been
defended largely with reference to other, ancillary values privacy may
serve. For instance, public privacy may be necessary to make the freedom
of association meaningful in practice.
This Article identifies a new dimension of public privacy, supplementing
extant justifications for the right, by arguing that many efforts to maintain
privacy while in “public” are properly conceptualized as forms of
performative, expressive resistance against an ever-pervasive surveillance
society. For example, when a person wears a hoodie in public obscuring
their identity, they may be engaged in active, expressive opposition to the
surveillance regime — communicating a refusal to be surveilled. The same
holds true when a person uses online obfuscation techniques to cloak their
cyber activities.
This Article isolates “performative privacy” as a social practice, and
explains how this identification of public, performative privacy may
provide doctrinal and discursive solutions to some of our most pressing
social controversies.
By demonstrating that functional demands for public privacy are often
expressive, this Article helps establish that public privacy is grounded in
* Copyright © 2017 Scott Skinner-Thompson. Acting Assistant Professor, New
York University School of Law. For helpful comments and conversations, thanks to
Amy Adler, Stuart Benjamin, Michael Boucai, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Julie Cohen,
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Bernard Harcourt, Joseph Landau, Sylvia Law, Art Leonard, Kate Levine, Ralf
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the First Amendment and covered by its robust protections. Discursively,
directly linking public privacy performances with the well-ensconced
freedom of expression may help shift societal reaction to such privacy
demands from suspicion to embrace. Moreover, to the extent that acts of
performative privacy cut across conflicts targeting racial, religious, or
sexual minorities (regulation of hoodies, head veils, and gender identity
are some examples), performative privacy has the potential to provide a
more universal and unifying normative response to these conflicts.
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INTRODUCTION
In popular discourse and in law, the right to privacy is often thought
to cover only those activities that occur in the home, the bedroom, a
doctor’s office, or on a personal, internet disabled computer.1 But less
scrutinized and developed is the privacy we demand while in plain
view — the privacy we perform in public. In fact, certain doctrines
provide that the right to privacy while in public does not exist at all,
that privacy is “dead” once you walk out your front door or expose
your activities to anyone else.2 Pursuant to this conception of the right
to privacy, privacy is synonymous with secrecy.3 But in a world of over
seven billion people and almost constant surveillance by state and
corporate actors,4 keeping one’s activities completely secret (and thus
entitled to a right to privacy under the traditional, “secrecy paradigm”)
is impossible.
In other words, “public privacy” ought not be a contradiction in
terms. Other scholars have rightfully begun to critique the secrecy
paradigm and advocate for a limited right to public privacy — a right
which would not permit unfettered government or private-party
surveillance of one’s activities while in public.5 But by and large,
public-privacy proponents have attempted to normatively and
1 See, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the
Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 913-18 (2010) (describing the homecentric focus of Fourth Amendment protections).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 289-90 (6th Cir. 2016)
(holding that there is no Fourth Amendment violation where police recorded an
individual’s activity outside his home for 10 weeks with a camera mounted on a utility
pole by the utility company without a warrant); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of
Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1536-37 (2000) (documenting that “privacy torts do
not protect things in public view on the theory that such things are, by definition, not
private”).
3 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 497 (2006)
[hereinafter Taxonomy] (explaining that under the “secrecy paradigm,” a phrase
Solove popularizes, “privacy is tantamount to complete secrecy, and a privacy
violation occurs when concealed data is revealed to others”).
4 The definition of “surveillance” employed throughout this Article does not refer
narrowly to surveillance for the purpose of government criminal investigations but,
rather, draws from surveillance studies scholars and refers to administrative,
bureaucratic, private, or criminal systems “that afford control of people through the
identification, tracking, monitoring, or analysis of individuals, data, or systems.”
TORIN MONAHAN, SURVEILLANCE IN THE TIME OF INSECURITY 8 (2010); see also DAVID
LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 2 (2001) (defining surveillance as “any collection and
processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of
influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered”).
5 See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 142-43
(2014) (arguing there should be “spheres of privacy in public”).
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doctrinally justify a right to public privacy by highlighting the indirect
support public privacy provides to other constitutional values. For
instance, they insightfully observe that the right to leave your home
and attend a civil rights organizing meeting without being tracked and
surveilled is necessary for the freedom of association to have meaning
in practice, and to prevent chilling of that right.6
This Article bolsters existing justifications for public privacy rights
by identifying what is, perhaps, a more direct constitutional value
served by a right to public privacy. The Article argues that attempts to
preserve a degree of privacy or anonymity in public are often a form of
performative and expressive opposition to an ever expanding
surveillance society and, as such, may be protected as symbolic
conduct. When an individual uses encryption technology to hide their
online communications, they are functionally maintaining their
privacy but also signaling disavowal of widespread internet
monitoring. When a person wears a hoodie shielding their identity,
they may be engaged in a form of active, expressive resistance to the
surveillance regime — lodging an objection to being surveilled. When
a transgender person demands the right to publicly express their true
gender identity while simultaneously invoking the right to keep
certain details about their birth-assigned sex or genital anatomy
obscure, they are performing the right to privacy and resisting
administrative surveillance. When a Muslim woman wears a head,
face, or body covering, she can be practicing her religion, but may also
be engaged in an act of performative privacy or modesty, registering
her refusal to be the object of social gaze. Recognizing the expressive
value of such privacy performances links these acts to the widelycherished right to freedom of speech and helps us reimagine acts that
are often viewed with distrust as part of a long history of democratic,
political dissent — dissent that is safeguarded by the First
Amendment.
This Article is among the first to comprehensively identify
performative privacy as a social phenomenon and to explore its legal
dimensions. It does so in three Parts.
Part I foregrounds how the solutions to many of our most pressing
public privacy problems will not be found in traditional privacy
doctrine, such as the Fourth Amendment.7 This Part examines and
6 E.g., Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The
Protection of Privacy in Public Spaces, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 305, 342 (2000) (analyzing
cases highlighting the connection between the right to public privacy and the freedom
of association).
7 See infra Part I.
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then deconstructs both the secrecy paradigm and public privacy
theories that rely on ancillary constitutional values to justify a right to
public privacy. While apt, there is reason to believe that such indirect
constitutional benefits are less likely to be recognized and vindicated
by courts because the purported harm is not palpable or immediate.
Part II then reveals and explores examples of performative privacy,
identifying and labeling a variety of social practices that are
simultaneously functional efforts to maintain privacy and expressive
forms of resistance against the scrutiny of the state and private,
corporate actors.8 Here, I point to multiple forms of evidence for
performative privacy. First, drawing in part on post-structural social
theory, I explain how functional acts designed to maintain public
privacy gain expressive texture and meaning in response to the
structures of surveillance which pervade society.9 In other words,
privacy efforts take on greater expressive meaning within the social
context of surveillance. Second, I highlight evidence indicating that
the state views functional efforts to maintain privacy as
communicative forms of resistance, highlighting privacy’s
performative, expressive role. In fact, in some instances the state relies
on the very expressive nature of an effort to maintain privacy to justify
regulation of that effort. Lastly, I point to examples where individuals
actually identify their privacy-enhancing acts as expressive.
Finally, Part III articulates the doctrinal and discursive payoffs, or
implications, of performative privacy.10 Doctrinally, by demonstrating
that demands for public privacy are often (but not always) imbued
with expression, this Article’s concept of performative privacy helps
establish that public privacy is grounded in the First Amendment’s
speech protections and that existing jurisprudence provides doctrinal
support for a right to performative privacy in public. Discursively,
understanding functional efforts to maintain privacy as a form of
outward-facing expression helps us appreciate that privacy is not just
important as a pre-political incubator for political thought, as it is
often characterized, but is, itself, directly political. Conceptualizing
privacy in such a manner accentuates privacy’s role in maintaining the
democratic balance between citizen and state, provides meaning to the
currently brittle public–private distinction, and dispels misplaced
8

See infra Part II.
As used here, “post-structural” simply refers to the idea that the meaning of
certain individual acts is partially defined by and in relation to the social structures
surrounding them, and that deviations from the norm can begin to destabilize those
same structures. For a much fuller discussion, see infra Part II.
10 See infra Part III.
9
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suspicion often associated with those who demand their privacy. By
helping society better understand the expressive dimension of
attempts to obtain privacy in public by, for example, wearing a hoodie,
the framework of performative privacy can help remove the initial,
negative reaction to such a practice and instead associate it as an
exercise of the freedom of speech — one of America’s most valued
ideals. Moreover, the rubric of performative privacy has the potential
to reinvigorate what we deem to be a “reasonable expectation” of
privacy by underscoring the degree to which we do take subtle, but
significant, efforts to guard our privacy. In these ways, performative
privacy can shift the rhetorical landscape currently surrounding many
attempts to obtain privacy in public.
In addition, while certainly no substitute for identity-based claims
against widespread structural racism, Islamophobia, and homo/
transphobia, to the extent that acts of performative privacy cut across
laws disproportionately targeting racial, religious, or gender minorities
(regulation of hoodies, bans on head veils, and laws that out
transgender individuals are some examples), performative privacy
promises to deliver a more collective and coalescing normative
response to these conflicts. Put differently, performative privacy helps
highlight the disparate burden of surveillance on marginalized
communities and identifies a collective form of political resistance.
I.

DECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PRIVACY LEGAL THEORY

Defended by a handful of scholars, privacy doctrine largely provides
that there is no right to privacy while in public. Other scholars argue
that to the extent a right to public privacy against unfettered
surveillance does exist, public privacy is justified because it indirectly
serves as an adjuvant to other constitutional values, such as the
freedom of association or movement, or as an incubator for the
development of ideas and then speech. This Part analyzes these two
positions, arguing that the privacy-only-in-private notion is
descriptively inaccurate and based on faulty assumptions regarding
how people live their lives in practice and the privacy they expect, as
others have also observed. It then turns to the prevailing pro-publicprivacy theories and analyzes how they are accurate and incredibly
important, but overlook public privacy’s expressive dimension, instead
relying on the indirect support public privacy would provide to other
constitutional rights.
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A. Privacy Only in Private
Several privacy doctrines provide that once a person enters the
public realm, any claim to privacy over that person’s activities while
they remain in public is non-existent.11 Likewise, to the extent a
person’s information is shared with another individual, the information
is effectively deemed “public” and any right to privacy over that
information that may once have existed is often extinguished. Under
the “privacy-only-in-private” approach, the right to limit or control
access to information subsists only to the extent the information is kept
completely within the private realm — within the confines of one’s
home.12 Pursuant to this notion, privacy is more or less synonymous
with complete secrecy.13 As many have noted, this anachronistic theory
ignores the ways in which we communicate, the ways we live our lives,
and has little or no basis in experience or logic.14
Nonetheless, it has found some support in scholarship and in
several doctrinal contexts. For example, some academics have argued
that once personal information enters the public domain, any claim to
privacy over that information is lost.15 Under this model, simply
11 See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 121 (2012) (“Generally
speaking, surveillance is fair game within public space, and also within spaces owned
by third parties, but not within spaces owned by the targets of surveillance.”).
12 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501, 504-05
(2007) (documenting “the Court’s requirement of superhuman individual efforts to
attain secrecy, that is, totally veiling one’s activities from the state’s prying eyes as an
essential prerequisite to the existence of privacy, all too often at the expense of human
relationships, interpersonal trust, and political voice”).
13 Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 3, at 497 (“If the information is not previously
hidden, then no privacy interest is implicated by the collection or dissemination of the
information. In many areas of law, this narrow view of privacy has limited the
recognition of privacy violations.”).
14 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE 100-01, 108 (2011) (critiquing the
“faulty reasoning” underlying the secrecy paradigm and observing that when one
shares information with a friend, one does not, in fact, assume that it will be shared
freely and widely); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1920 (2010) (noting that “[p]eople expose information
with varying expectations of the extent and nature of its future exposure”); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2005)
(observing that most people share their “most embarrassing details with other
people”); see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 347 (1983) (observing
that “[c]ourts using the ‘location’ analysis commonly state that information
individuals reveal about themselves in public places is by definition not private,” but
concluding that such a test ignores the varying degrees of “public” spaces and the
difficulty of defining what counts as “public”).
15 See, e.g., W. A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269,
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sharing information with a close friend is enough to constitute a
voluntary disclosure that negates privacy.16 Specifically, Heidi Reamer
Anderson has defended a “no-privacy-in-public” regime, arguing in
part that the pragmatic benefits of exposure of socially undesirable
behavior outweigh any potential loss of personal dignity or loss of
“thinking space.”17 Others have largely endorsed Fourth Amendment
rules that limit any privacy protections against government access
once the information at issue is transmitted to another person or
entity.18
Beyond scholarship, particular legal doctrines and court decisions
suggest that any right to privacy is dramatically curtailed once a
person or their information has entered the public realm. For example,
in tort law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides with regard to
the tort of publication of private facts that “there is no liability for
giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the
public.”19
In the Fourth Amendment criminal procedure context, the thirdparty doctrine stipulates that, in certain situations, an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy evaporates once an individual shares
the relevant information with another person, sometimes referred to as
a so-called “third-party.”20 Correspondingly, under what has been
270-71 (1983) (“What belongs to the public domain cannot without glaring paradox
be called private; consequently it should not be incorporated within our concept of
privacy.”).
16 Id. at 273.
17 Heidi Reamer Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense of
No Privacy in Public, 7 I/S 543, 597-98 (2012) (balancing purported benefits of noprivacy-in-public rule with costs, and tentatively concluding that the lack of privacy in
public is most advantageous in terms of government accountability, criminal
deterrence, and deception prevention).
18 E.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
576 (2009) (arguing that “[w]ithout the [third-party] doctrine, criminals could use
third-party agents to fully enshroud their criminal enterprises in Fourth Amendment
protection”).
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (holding that there is no
privacy violation where press published information about a rape victim that was
already in the public domain via court records); Paton-Simpson, supra note 6, at 31011 (documenting that under American tort law, “[t]here is generally no liability for
observing, following, or photographing someone in a public place,” and that
“[p]laintiffs have been denied any right to privacy not only on the street but also in
shops, laundromats, restaurants, health spas, parking lots, airports, common areas of
cruise ships, and school buildings”).
20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
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dubbed “assumption of the risk,” the Supreme Court has concluded
that when individuals volunteer information to others, they are
assuming the risk that the other party may be an informant who may
relay the information to law enforcement.21 In such situations, the
Court has held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred.22
A related Fourth Amendment concept, the open fields doctrine, has
also been used to curtail the right to privacy — even on an individual’s
own property. The open fields doctrine provides that an individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy for activities conducted out-ofdoors, in fields or property not directly adjacent to the home (an area
known as “curtilage”).23 The Supreme Court has relied on the open
fields doctrine to hold, for example, that no warrant was required for
police to walk past a locked gate and “No Trespassing” signs and into
secluded property in order to investigate reports that marijuana was
being grown.24 Interpreting the open fields doctrine on multiple
occasions, the Supreme Court has taken a broad view of when
privately-owned property is exposed or open to the public and thus
entitled to minimal Fourth Amendment privacy protections.25
Amendment protection.”). As Kathy Strandburg has pointed out, in certain contexts,
the phrase “third-party doctrine” is a misnomer since not all cases involve information
shared between more than two individuals. Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on
the Web and other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L.
REV. 614, 652 n.201 (2011) [hereinafter Home, Home on the Web]. For a nuanced
discussion of the third-party doctrine and the Fourth Amendment more broadly, see
generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
611 (2015).
21 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (finding no Fourth
Amendment violation where Jimmy Hoffa relied “upon his misplaced confidence that
[the informant] would not reveal [Hoffa’s] wrongdoing”); see also Taslitz, supra note
12, at 501-02 (noting Hoffa’s “role in the growth of the ‘assumption of the risk’
doctrine as the primary basis for drastically limiting the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections”).
22 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (confirming that “a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information” voluntarily shared with a
third party); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (reiterating that
pursuant to Hoffa, information shared with another based on the misplaced belief that
the other party will keep it secret does not constitute a legitimate expectation of
privacy for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
23 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-80 (1984).
24 Id. at 173, 177.
25 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989) (no warrant required for police to
inspect predominately enclosed but partially open greenhouse within curtilage of
home from a helicopter 400 feet above the ground, notwithstanding that greenhouse
could not be seen into from street); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303-04
(1987) (no warrant required for police to enter onto a 198-acre property, cross over a
perimeter fence as well as multiple interior fences, and peer into a locked barn located
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The Court has also held that when an individual places garbage on
the street curb for collection, even if temporarily and opaquely
packaged, such “public exposure” defeats any reasonable privacy
expectation.26 A similar criminal procedure concept, the “plain view”
doctrine, provides that police officers may seize evidence of
contraband when visible from a lawful vantage point.27
The theme that links the third-party doctrine, the open fields
doctrine, the plain view doctrine, assumption of the risk, and the
secrecy paradigm more broadly, is the underlying notion that there is
no right to privacy in public — if information is even marginally
exposed to others, the government and private parties are often
permitted broad access.
But, as others have argued, public privacy is not an oxymoron.28
And rigid application of these doctrines ignores that individuals do, in
fact, expect privacy when they share intimate information with a
friend while in a public restaurant, for instance. They do not expect
that the information will become universally accessible merely because
they shared it within limited confines.29 With regard to physical
half of a mile from the public road and in close proximity to the property’s residence);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1986) (no warrant required for aerial
search of backyard within curtilage of home that was enclosed by 2 separate fences,
one 6 feet tall and the other 10 feet tall); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227, 229, 238-39 (1986) (extending Ciraolo and permitting EPA aerial surveillance of
outdoor area of Dow’s extensive power plant facility without a warrant despite
“elaborate security around the perimeter of the complex”). But see Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of thermal imaging technology on
house constitutes a search for which a warrant is required).
26 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1988).
27 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742-44 (1983) (no warrant required where
police observed and then seized a balloon believed to contain drugs in an automobile
that had been lawfully stopped at routine driver’s license checkpoint); cf. Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980) (“It is . . . well settled that objects such as
weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without a
warrant. The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is
presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the
property with criminal activity.”).
28 E.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory
of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1044 (1995) (explaining
that “public privacy” only sounds like an oxymoron because of the way we think of
“public” and “privacy” in fixed, absolute terms).
29 Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After
Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) (describing how “[o]rdinary life involves
sharing with other persons in ways that are simultaneously private and public”); Erin
Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and
Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1252 (2009) (arguing that the third-party doctrine
ought to be revised to reflect that when disclosures are made in confidence, the

2017]

Performative Privacy

1683

privacy, they do not expect that by dint of exiting their front door (a
requirement of living in a society), they are providing open access to
their movements to the government and private parties alike.
Not only is the secrecy paradigm descriptively inaccurate from a
behavioral standpoint, it is increasingly debilitating as privacyinvading technologies30 expand the reach of state and private,
corporate surveillance regimes.31 The physical and informational zone
of what is truly secret — known to no one else — is shrinking
dramatically.32 As such, under the “privacy-only-in-private” theory,
the law protects very little indeed. Paradoxically, as surveillance
regimes expand (decreasing what can functionally be kept secret), the
right to privacy is extinguished along with it.33 Instead of serving as a
government and the law should respect that confidence); Laurent Sacharoff, The
Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249, 1270-71 (2012)
(explaining that our privacy expectations exists in “widening circles” and that we
expect more privacy from individuals with whom we are not personally close); Scott
Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 202 (2015) [hereinafter
Outing Privacy] (“The third-party doctrine wrongly assumes that information is either
openly public or completely secret.”).
30 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by
the advance of technology. . . . The question we confront today is what limits there are
upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”); see also
Paton-Simpson, supra note 6, at 321 (“A rogue factor that not only disrupts normal
expectations of public privacy but also undermines the distinction between public and
private places is the use of privacy-invasive technologies.”).
31 Of course, state and private surveillance often work hand-in-hand and are often
far from distinct. Roy Coleman, Reclaiming the Streets: Closed Circuit Television,
Neoliberalism and the Mystification of Social Divisions in Liverpool, UK, 2 SURVEILLANCE
& SOC’Y 293, 296 (2004) (“For in reality there is not, and has not been, any easily
maintained distinction between state and extra-state power, or ‘public’ and ‘private’
authority.”).
32 Reidenberg, supra note 5, at 142 (“In a world of 24/7 data tracking,
warehousing, and mining, technology has transformed obscurity, accessibility, and
transparency of personal information in ways that subvert the utility of the ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ constitutional standard.”); see Katherine J. Strandburg,
Monitoring, Datafication, and Consent: Legal Approaches to Privacy in the Big Data
Context, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 5, 10-11 (Julia Lane et al. eds.,
2014) (stating that datafication enhances the ability to organize information therefore
increasing the likelihood it will be put to unintended purposes).
33 Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 118 (2008) (“So long as
Fourth Amendment privacy is parasitical on private-sphere privacy, the former must
die as its host dies, and this host is undoubtedly faltering today in the networked,
monitored and digitized world we are learning to call our own.”); see also Crocker,
supra note 29, at 6-7 (“If public exposure forfeits privacy protections, then how
constitutional doctrine defines public exposure determines what aspects of ordinary
life receive protection from government interference. What receives constitutional
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bulwark against encroachments on privacy, the “privacy-only-inprivate” theory is defined in such a way to ensure that privacy will, in
fact, be dead.34 And this cramped definition of privacy permits
privacy-invading technologies and both criminal and administrative
surveillance regimes to have free rein.
B. Limited Privacy in Public
Observing the conceptual and practical shortcomings of “privacyonly-in-private” doctrines, other scholars have powerfully advocated for
a limited right to privacy in public. These advocates for public privacy
have begun to create limited cracks35 in the secrecy paradigm by
emphasizing that public privacy is necessary for several other
constitutional values to have practical effect. As noted at the outset,
these explanations for public privacy’s importance are accurate but
perhaps incomplete. And justifying public privacy with reliance on
other, indirect constitutional benefits has, thus far, had limited judicial
purchase, in part because the benefits are more tangential and harder for
courts to discern. And then harder still for courts to weigh the indirect
constitutional benefits against competing government interests, such as
security and public safety.36 That is, courts are often forced to weigh
protection in turn shapes the boundaries of ordinary life.”).
34 Cf. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get over It’, WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999),
http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538 (quoting Sun Microsystems
CEO Scott McNealy as arguing that “[y]ou have zero privacy anyway” and exhorting
society to “[g]et over it”).
35 E.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties” and noting the chilling threat posed to associational and
expressive freedoms); see United States v. Lambis, No. 15-cr-734, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90085, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016) (ruling that third party doctrine did
not excuse use of cell-site simulator, or StingRay, without a warrant because cellular
data was communicated to government, not third party). But see United States v.
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424-25 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (ruling that third-party
doctrine excuses collection of cell-site location data from warrant requirement because
the criminal suspect exposed the data to cell phone service provider); United States v.
Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 289-90 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that a police video recording
of person’s activities outside their home for ten weeks did not require a warrant).
36 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1972) (ruling that purported injury
from chilling effect of Army surveillance of civil political activity was too attenuated to
even support plaintiff’s standing to bring suit); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1051-52 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Yet not every
Government action that has an inhibiting or constrictive impact on First Amendment
activity is said therefore to have an impermissible ‘chilling effect.’”); see also SkinnerThompson, Outing Privacy, supra note 29, at 173 (collecting cases and arguing that, at
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privacy concerns against concerns over safety and security, and if
privacy’s importance is limited to indirectly creating space for the
exercise of other constitutional values, it will often lose out.37
In both criminal procedure and tort law, public-privacy proponents
have emphasized public privacy’s ability to indirectly prevent chilling
of constitutionally protected activity, such as association or speech.
For example, in the tort context, scholars have critiqued tort law’s
stubborn adherence to the no-privacy-in-public paradigm, and rightly
observed that such a rule “is flawed in a modern technological society
where the video camcorder has become a permanent fixture.”38 In
making the case for a limited tort of “public intrusion” where the
plaintiff has taken actions that manifest their desire for privacy in
public, Andrew McClurg emphasizes the chilling effect that being
observed while in public can have on behavior.39 Elizabeth PatonSimpson has advocated similarly for privacy tort protections even
while in public, stressing how a right to privacy in public would give
life to the freedom of association. Paton-Simpson observes, as an
example, how surveillance of individuals who attend a union meeting
chills the constitutionally protected ability to associate and organize.40
Similar instrumental justifications for public privacy are offered in
the criminal procedure/Fourth Amendment context. For example,
scholars have documented that the Olmstead/Katz “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test, which dictates that no search implicating
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement occurs if a person does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or item
searched, has been interpreted to give undue primacy to the home as
the space where we expect privacy.41 As Marc Blitz advocates, courts
least in the context of informational privacy, courts struggle when there are “too many
causal steps” between the privacy violation and the purported harm).
37 As discussed more fully in Parts II and III, this Article’s identification and
promotion of “performative privacy” supplements existing normative justifications for
public privacy by directly linking demands for public privacy with the First
Amendment’s robust protections for expressive conduct. See infra Parts II–III.
Arguably, suggesting that efforts to maintain privacy are expressive is still an appeal to
an “indirect” value, but by highlighting that the act of privacy is, in itself, expressive,
the distance between the privacy effort and the constitutional harm is tightened.
38 E.g., McClurg, supra note 28, at 990-91.
39 Id. at 1035-36.
40 Paton-Simpson, supra note 6, at 342. Paton-Simpson also astutely notes that a
system without public privacy affords more protection to the affluent, who can afford
to build higher walls — both literal and technological — to keep surveillance regimes
at bay. Id. at 343.
41 See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public
Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX.
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should give more attention to the privacy architecture that exists
within public space and should protect the “public” enclaves that
provide refuge for individual freedom (for example, the freedom one
can find in public by putting distance or barriers between others and
one’s activities).42 But Blitz, too, normatively justifies the right to
public privacy with reference to the instrumental benefits it provides,
i.e., because public privacy enables people the “freedom to reinvent
themselves.”43
Likewise, Christopher Slobogin has explained that the Fourth
Amendment ought to apply to government efforts to surveil public
activity and that while a warrant may not be required, the government
nevertheless is obliged to justify its use of public surveillance.44 To
Slobogin, public anonymity is important because it helps assure the
freedom of movement and gives meaning to the freedoms of
association and speech.45 Without some degree of public privacy or
anonymity, anonymous speech and the ability to organize in secret
would be chilled.46 Other scholars have rightly extended that

L. REV. 1349, 1363-65 (2004) (arguing that the Katz framework set out the home as
one of the prime protected spaces).
42 Id. at 1415, 1444.
43 Id. at 1480-81. Andrew Ferguson has also recently argued that there ought to be
Fourth Amendment protections against government surveillance while in public,
advancing a concept called “personal curtilage.” Under Ferguson’s personal curtilage
conception, which is arguably consistent with this Article’s concept of performative
privacy, individuals can gain freedom from government surveillance while in public
by “affirmatively act[ing] to mark out the area of security.” Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283,
1287-92 (2014).
44 Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 312-14 (2002).
45 Id. at 252-58.
46 Id. at 253; see also Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 153-55 (2007) (suggesting that the First Amendment ought to
limit government information gathering when there is an indirect chilling effect on
communications or associations that “implicate belief, discourse, or relationships of a
political, cultural, or religious nature”). Joel Reidenberg, too, has argued that a limited
right to be free from government surveillance while in public is necessary because
“constitutional democracy depends on spheres of privacy in public to preserve public
safety and fair governance.” Reidenberg, supra note 5, at 143. Reidenberg suggests that
acts which occur in public but have no bearing on democratic governance (such as a
phone call to a friend from a payphone) are entitled to public privacy, while acts
which are directed at the government (such as a protest) are not entitled to public
privacy. Id. at 155-57.
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argument,47 explaining how surveillance of our networked activities,
not just our physical activities, chills the freedom to associate.48
On a broader, conceptual level, Helen Nissenbaum has critiqued the
public–private divide that has dominated philosophical theories of
privacy because that divide obscures that public surveillance injures
the values associated with privacy in the same ways that intrusions
into our intimate affairs may.49 For Nissenbaum, the values served by
public privacy “are wide-ranging, including individual values such as
autonomy, liberty, individuality, capacity to form and maintain
intimate relations, mental health, creativity, personal growth, as well
as social values such as a free and democratic society.”50 While not
focused exclusively on the question of public privacy, others have also

47 See Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom
in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 590 (2014) (explaining that
“historical and recent government surveillance chills associational freedom” and that
“data aggravates that problem”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a
Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV.
741, 747-48 (2008) (arguing compellingly that surveillance of networked
relationships ought to be viewed as implicating the freedom to associate and be
subject to First Amendment strict scrutiny); Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership
Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association’s Specificity Requirement, 10 I/S 327, 356-65
(2014) (extending freedom of association’s protection to NSA’s telephony metadata
program).
48 Even in contexts less historically associated with privacy law, such as
intellectual property, public privacy has often been promoted on the basis of its
indirect, instrumental benefits. See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54
CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 297, 301 (2003) (arguing that extensive surveillance for
the purpose of detecting piracy online has the potential to chill both legitimate and
illegitimate creative development).
49 Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559, 569-70 (1998) [hereinafter Protecting Privacy].
Similarly, in the information privacy context, Ari Waldman has powerfully explained
how viewing privacy law as protecting relationships of trust will better capture when
information should be entitled to protection than the faulty public–private divide. Ari
Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World,
69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 561-64 (2015).
50 Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy, supra note 49, at 593; see also Frank Rudy
Cooper, Surveillance and Identity Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by Martin Luther
King, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 537-38 (2008) (explaining that
“surveillance has the power to prevent people from performing their identities as they
would see fit” through “means of pressuring them to adhere to preexisting cultural
norms”); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2013) (suggesting that obscurity while engaged on the “public”
internet is important to protect individuals from being pressured to conform to social
norms).
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noted privacy’s role in creating space for the development of political
thought.51
These critiques of the secrecy paradigm and the ways in which it has
manifested itself across many areas of substantive law are apt, and they
have helped open certain courts’ eyes to public privacy’s potential.52
But, by and large, the development of a right to public privacy has
been slow in coming and many doctrines maintain their dogged
commitment to the secrecy paradigm.53
It seems possible that the sluggishness with which the purported
right to public privacy has manifested itself in doctrine is in part
because it has been justified on the same instrumental terms and with
the same values that the right to privacy writ large has been (with
mixed success) defended. For example, as discussed above, some have
attempted to draw a direct parallel between the norms underlying
public privacy and the norms underlying privacy into our personal
affairs.54 But defending the right to privacy in courts with reference to
amorphous values (such as dignity or autonomy) has by many
accounts been a failed exercise.55
Perhaps more to the point, justifying the right to be free from public
surveillance by, for example, closed-circuit television networks, by
51 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905
(2013) (“[F]reedom from surveillance, whether public or private, is foundational to
the practice of informed and reflective citizenship.”); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual
Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408-25 (2008) (outlining the connection between
intellectual privacy and freedom of thought); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1945-46 (2013) [hereinafter Dangers] (arguing
“that new ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of public exposure”
and “that a meaningful guarantee of privacy — protection from surveillance or
interference — is necessary to promote this kind of intellectual freedom”); cf. JAMES C.
SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS xii (1990)
[hereinafter DOMINATION] (documenting how subordinate groups create a “‘hidden
transcript’ that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the
dominant”).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (arguing the third-party doctrine is ill-suited for today’s society and
technology, and noting that other constitutional liberties are at play).
53 See supra Part I.A.
54 E.g., Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy, supra note 49, at 569-70.
55 See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 10, 108 (2010) (suggesting
that reliance on “higher-order values” to justify privacy often fails to resolve conflicts
between privacy and other interests); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977) (“A legal concept will do us little good if it expands like a
gas to fill up the available space.”); see also JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 7
(2001) (documenting the shortcomings of privacy-centric approaches to combatting
widespread administrative surveillance).
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relying on indirect concerns about “chilling” the freedom to meet and
associate requires courts to take more causal steps than may be
necessary in order to normatively and doctrinally justify a right to
public privacy.56 It frames privacy as a tool used to harness other
values and rights, rather than emphasizing privacy’s inherent, and
more potent, power.57
As demonstrated below, conceptualizing efforts to maintain privacy
in public as expressive, performative acts highlights a more direct
dimension and value of public privacy and ties it more directly to the
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.58 Such a
framing may not only have doctrinal benefits, but may also have
meaningful discursive, societal effects, elevating our understanding of
privacy’s value.
II.

REVEALING PERFORMATIVE PRIVACY

Individuals’ efforts to maintain privacy, anonymity, or obscurity
while simultaneously engaged in public activity ought to be
understood as performative, expressive acts — expressions that may
often be protected directly by the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.59 Certainly, as outlined in Part I.B, maintaining
anonymity while in public by wearing a hoodie or using internet
obfuscation technology instrumentally aids one’s freedom of
movement or freedom to associate without being detected by public
surveillance. But it is more than that. As government and corporate
surveillance of both our physical and cyber activities becomes
ubiquitous, efforts taken to shield activities from surveillance are not
always just a means to an end — a means to effectuate other
constitutional values. Instead, they are often a direct statement of
56 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1972) (chilling effect from surveillance
was too indirect); cf. Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, supra note 29, at 173.
57 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422-23
(1980) (arguing that once privacy is explicitly defended on its own merits, instead of
justified in terms of other, ancillary rights, it would gain validation).
58 Judith Wagner DeCew’s version of what she labels “expressive privacy” is quite
different from what I identify as performative, expressive privacy. For DeCew,
expressive privacy is more akin to the instrumental concept of intellectual privacy. See
supra note 51. That is, under DeCew’s formulation, “privacy protects a realm for
expressing one’s self-identity or personhood through speech or activity.” JUDITH
WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY 77 (1997). But for DeCew, the functional
demand for privacy does not appear to be, in and of itself, outwardly expressive. Id.
59 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble . . . .”).

1690

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:1673

resistance to the pervasive surveillance regimes. In such instances,
they are entitled to First Amendment protections from government
infringement.
This Part demonstrates how “performative privacy” is conceptually
coherent and descriptively accurate, and does the work of identifying
and labeling examples of performative privacy. Evidence that
functional efforts to maintain privacy in public are also expressive
comes in three principal forms: (1) the state’s regulatory reaction to
functional efforts to maintain privacy, (2) individuals’ selfidentification of such acts as expressive, and (3) post-structural social
theory, which elevates social context as a backdrop that helps make
individuals’ actions intelligible. After outlining the post-structural
theoretical foundations for performative privacy, this Part analyzes
several real-world examples of performative privacy.
In Part III, the Article explains how conceptualizing public privacy
demands as expressive will help such demands find doctrinal
protection and protection in the court of public opinion.
A. Performative Privacy in Theory
This Article’s thesis — that functional efforts to maintain privacy
can also serve as expressive forms of resistance to surveillance
structures — is supported by, and in turn extends, post-structural
theory. The post-structural concept of performative privacy serves to
highlight the degree to which we, as individuals, are being observed,
operated on, and controlled by surveillance systems, and at the same
time helps label a form of resistance — and one with doctrinal footing.
Put differently, the concept of performativity as applied to privacy can
help expose the extent to which individuals are subjects of
surveillance structures, and simultaneously reveals methods for
maintaining democratic agency and points of resistance within those
surveillance networks.60 That is to say, “performative privacy” helps us
understand the scope of privacy problems and identify potential
solutions.
Political theorist Judith Butler first articulated the contemporary
post-structural concept of performativity while scrutinizing prevailing,
60 See JOHN E. MCGRATH, LOVING BIG BROTHER 16 (2004) (arguing that agency can
be achieved by mocking surveillance, even if the agency is “never fully volitional,” but
focusing on efforts to ape surveillance, rather than efforts to perform privacy and
avoid identification); cf. Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative
of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1596-98 (2015) (discussing
principled resistance through the assertion of individual rights as a form of political
participation critical to checking state power).
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heteronormative conceptions of gender and sex.61 Butler explained
that social performances of gender, rather than expressing anything
innate, ingrained, essential, or “true” about what it meant to be male
or female, were often mere reflections of the dominant social
constructions and conceptions of a particular gender. In Butler’s
words, “the anticipation conjures its object . . . the anticipation of a
gendered essence produces that which it posits as outside itself.”62
While Butler suggested that we were all, in essence, performing and
reproducing socially-inscribed notions of gender, she also explained
that both subconscious and self-conscious performances that
challenged prevailing norms, for example, through drag, could
“expose the tenuousness of gender ‘reality.’”63 Drawing from Michel
Foucault, Butler explained that rather than remaining a passive
medium reflecting dominant norms, the body could be transformed
into an expressive site of resistance.64 And the expressive value of nonnormative gender performances was amplified precisely because of the
dominant structures of heteronormativity — that is, gender
performances that deviated from the norm were imbued with agency
and expressive meaning in part because of their oppositional
positioning to hegemonic social expectations.65
But the pertinence of performativity is not limited to gender politics.
As another example, in her more recent work, Butler extends the
theory of gender performance to the plural performativity of social
movements engaged in acts of public assembly. By physically
occupying contested public space, public gatherings communicate and
61 See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (2006) (exploring the theory of
gender performativity). While luminary, Butler’s development of performativity built
on related concepts first identified by Michel Foucault, J.L. Austin, Erving Goffman,
and others. See, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6-7 (1962)
(explaining that certain utterances are performative in that they perform an action, or
speech act).
62 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at xv; cf. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU
GULATI, ACTING WHITE? 94 (2013) (“Grooming requirements such as makeup for
women and short hair for men help to constitute gender. They shape what it means to
be a man and what it means to be a woman.”); Clare Huntington, Staging the Family,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 611-14 (2013) (arguing that family roles are performed and
that such performances have a “communicative effect, on others and the self” such
that they “construct familial categories and create social meaning”).
63 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at xxv.
64 See id. at 175-78.
65 As explained by David Hoy in his book on critical resistance, “[t]he particular
social structure provides the grid of intelligibility for making sense of the actions as
conforming to or dissenting from the given power configuration.” DAVID COUZENS
HOY, CRITICAL RESISTANCE 3 (2004).
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signify a message “prior to, and apart from, any particular demands
they make.”66 That message is one which calls “into question the
inchoate and powerful dimensions of reigning notions of the
political.”67 In other words, the embodied plural performances of
public assemblies question whether the body politic is being served by
prevailing democratic governance. For Butler, public assemblies
perform an “expressive and signifying function” demanding more
livable political and economic conditions.68
In short, a post-structural theory of performative politics posits at
least four things: (1) social performances conjure and re-inscribe
normative identities and values; (2) actions (whether they be public
assembly, drag, or, as I suggest, privacy demands) that deviate from
prevailing performances can be expressive forms of resistance separate
and apart from any linguistic utterance that may (or may not)
accompany them; (3) these actions’ expressive value is derived, at least
in part, from the fact that they are deviating from prevailing social
performances; and (4) the deviant actions’ expressive power is so great
that it can begin to erode, dismantle, or recraft the social structures to
which they are responding.
66 JUDITH BUTLER, NOTES TOWARDS A PERFORMATIVE THEORY OF ASSEMBLY 8 (2015)
[hereinafter ASSEMBLY]; cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, Political Disobedience, in OCCUPY:
THREE INQUIRIES IN DISOBEDIENCE 45, 53 (Mitchell et al. eds., 2013) (“The [Occupy]
resistance movement can only be ‘heard,’ syntactically, from its place of
occupation . . . .”).
67 BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 9.
68 Id. at 11. In a complementary vein, Camille Gear Rich has powerfully explained
that “part of the process of constituting oneself as a social actor requires the
acceptance and recognition of racial/ethnic codes and markings and the mobilization
of these codes to ensure that other actors read them in the manner that ensures one is
placed in the desired race or ethnic group.” Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and
Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1134, 1178 (2004). That is, crafting one’s social identity involves an expressive
performance that feeds off of, and helps shape, social norms/structures. Similarly, as
recently documented by Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, dominant, white workplace
culture within the United States causes individuals to work their identities — that is,
they either conform to the prevailing social norms and structures and attempt to
“pass,” or resist such structures through non-conformance. Efforts to work one’s
identity are clearly communicative and involve what Gulati and Carbado label
“signaling strategies.” CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 62, at 23-26; see also Kenji
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 780-81 (2002) (documenting how people play
down aspects of their identities in different contexts, and are sometimes encouraged to
do so by the law); cf. John Gilliom, Struggling with Surveillance: Resistance,
Consciousness, and Identity, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE & VISIBILITY 111,
114 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2006) [hereinafter Struggling with
Surveillance] (emphasizing the importance of understanding surveillance resistance as
occurring within a structural context of networked surveillance technologies).
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Put in context, when men engage in sodomy, they express a
challenge to gender norms and create new, less violent and less
restrictive norms; when people gather in Zuccotti Park, they contest
neoliberal political governance and suggest that there are different
ways to conceive of participatory democracy; and, as I will show,
when individuals attempt to maintain privacy while in public, they
express resistance to surveillance regimes and also help shape
community norms regarding privacy as a valuable social good and
help redraw the line separating public from private.69
This theory of performative privacy draws additional support from
the work of Jean Baudrillard, who explained that while objects often
have a functional value — the instrumental purpose for which the
object is used — they also have symbolic and sign value relative to
other objects and to people within a system of objects.70 According to
Baudrillard, objects signify certain messages and the content of that
message is partially determined based on an object’s relationship to
other objects, and the people who use or display the object(s).71 He
labeled this system a “signifying fabric.”72
Here, I am addressing the signifying effects of privacy efforts within
the social fabric of widespread surveillance. The extent to which the
surveillance regime has penetrated our lives is vividly conveyed by
69 Cf. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at xxiv (“[N]o political revolution
is possible without a radical shift in one’s notion of the possible and the real.”);
TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 69 (2015) (“[T]he struggle, in and of
itself, has meaning.”).
70 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FOR A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SIGN 29
(Charles Levin trans., 1981) (arguing that an object’s sign value is often more
important and valuable than its pragmatic, functional value); JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE
SYSTEM OF OBJECTS 4 (James Benedict trans., 1996) [hereinafter THE SYSTEM OF
OBJECTS] (isolating for study a “‘spoken’ system of objects — that is, the study of the
more or less consistent meanings that objects institute”).
71 BAUDRILLARD, THE SYSTEM OF OBJECTS, supra note 70, at 200 (explaining that an
object “derives its consistency, and hence its meaning, from an abstract and systematic
relationship to all other sign-objects”).
72 Id. Indeed, to the extent that sociologists have often recognized that criminal
punishment serves an expressive function — expressing the conscience collective of
the community/state — it is no great leap to suggest that functional efforts to resist
surveillance, discipline, and punishment are also expressive. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND,
PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 68 (1990) (explaining that the penal process is “a
means of evoking, expressing, and modifying passions, as well as an instrumental
procedure for administering offenders”). As others have noted, surveillance systems
are not neutral or a-political, but instead communicate and create normative, often
neoliberal, messages. See, e.g., Kirstie Ball et al., Big Data Surveillance and the BodySubject, 22 BODY & SOC’Y 58, 70-71 (2016) (“[S]urveillance communicates value
systems to the surveilled.”); Coleman, supra note 31, at 299-300.
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Bernard Harcourt — “ordinary life is uncannily converging with
practices of punishment: The see-throughness of our digital lives
mirrors the all-seeingness of the penal sphere.”73 Put another way,
“the infrastructure, by default, gathers data on you.”74 As surveillance
scholars have observed, “[i]n many respects surveillance is
constitutive of modern society.”75 That is, surveillance in its varied
forms (administrative, technological, and penal) is pervasive and
dramatically shapes and restricts behavior, a point richly highlighted
by Julie Cohen, who argues that privacy theorists should abandon
notions of selfhood cultivated purely through solitary development.76
According to Cohen, surveillance regimes impact and alter the
development of both space and individual identity, which are
intimately linked.77
73 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED 21 (2015). As Harcourt and others have noted,
society is now organized or structured in such a way that we willingly surrender or
volunteer many aspects of our privacy in exchange for the mere opportunity to
participate, or live, in society. Id. at 15; see, e.g., Ball, et al., supra note 72, at 64
(explaining that big data succeeds “by co-opting individuals into de facto surveillance
of their own private lives”).
74 FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION 49-50 (2015); cf. STEVEN
LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 21-22 (1974) (explaining that social structures are
maintained not just by control over individual acts, “but also, most importantly, by
the socially structured and culturally patterned behavior of groups, and practices of
institutions, which may indeed be manifested in individuals’ inaction”).
75 E.g., Aaron K. Martin et al., Understanding Resistance to Digital Surveillance:
Towards a Multi-Disciplinary, Multi-Actor Framework, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 213,
216 (2009).
76 COHEN, supra note 11, at 129-30; see also id. at 140 (“Like identities, places are
dynamic and relational; they are constructed over time through everyday practice.”).
77 See id. at 141 (“Transparency alters the parameters of evolving subjectivity by
imposing normalizing categories and distinctions; exposure alters the capacity of
places to function as contexts within which identity is developed and performed.”).
While Julie Cohen’s dismantling of networked surveillance is crucial, she seems to
stop short of analyzing the implications of her critique for resistance efforts. In fact, at
times, she appears skeptical of efforts to resist the normalizing and retarding effects of
surveillance (efforts she calls “self-defense”) because, according to Cohen, they occur
at the individual level and a collective response is needed. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy,
Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 199-201 (2008).
Although I agree that collective responses are desirable, it is not clear to me why acts
of performative privacy cannot be group based. But more significantly, the back-andforth development/dialogue between social structures and individual play (that Cohen
helps identify) is precisely why efforts to performatively resist can have such an
impact — the efforts can help shape norms, expectations, and laws. See David J.
Phillips, From Privacy to Visibility, 23 SOC. TEXT 95, 95 (2005) (“The ability to present
the self [and, I would add, conceal the self], and to make moral claims about how one
is to be perceived and acted toward, is a fundamental mechanism for structuring social
relations and for asserting social power.”).
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Into this (in some ways self-inflicted) Panopticon step efforts to
maintain privacy while in public. I argue that such efforts are often a
form of performative, expressive resistance to the surveillance regimes
— that they communicate and signal opprobrium of surveillance,
shine a critical spotlight on that surveillance,78 and by so doing, offer a
reimagined place for privacy in our social structures.79 As with acts of
public assembly, “some matter of political significance is being
enacted and conveyed” by functional efforts to maintain (or take back)
privacy.80 Performative privacy as a dimension of public privacy has
the potential to subvert the reality that a surveilled individual “is the
object of information, never a subject in communication.”81 The
concept of performative privacy highlights that by mitigating the
surveillance, one can be transformed from object into communicator.82
In the next subpart, I analyze several efforts to maintain privacy in
order to demonstrate that the theory of performative privacy is
descriptively accurate — that is, that it is more just a theory, but a
lived reality. In the final Part, I outline the various implications for
this Article’s theory of performative privacy.
B. Performative Privacy in Practice
Even before Edward Snowden revealed details regarding the
National Security Agency’s efforts to surveil the American public
through sophisticated metadata programs, the extent to which our
every digital and physical fingerprint was observed, recorded,
78 Because “power functions more effectively the less visible it is,” acts of
performative privacy draw out exercises of state power from behind their cameras and
force the use of more direct forms of power, thereby exposing power structures. HOY,
supra note 65, at 83.
79 Cf. SCOTT, DOMINATION, supra note 51, at 196 (“So long as the elite treat such
assaults on their dignity as tantamount to open rebellion, symbolic defiance and
rebellion do amount to the same thing.”); MCGRATH, supra note 60, at 218-19
(arguing that surveillance performance critiques help us comprehend responses to
surveilled space).
80 See BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note, 66, at 22.
81 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977);
cf. Mimi Thi Nguyen, The Hoodie as Sign, Screen, Expectation, and Force, 40 SIGNS 791,
813 (2015) (“To be an object is to be determined by another . . . .”).
82 As Hille Koskela has explained, “[s]pace can feel oppressive: ‘like an enemy
itself,’ but reclaiming space can — at the same time — be the precondition of
emancipation.” Hille Koskela, ‘The Gaze Without Eyes’: Video-Surveillance and the
Changing Nature of Urban Space, 24 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 243, 259 (2000)
(citation omitted). Performative privacy embellishes Koskela’s point by underscoring
how reclaiming space through efforts to maintain privacy is directly emancipatory,
directly expressive, and not merely a precondition for freedom.
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aggregated, and scrutinized was relatively well-documented.83 Indeed,
the use of surveillance as a tool for social control is quite old.84 In the
face of that surveillance, individuals and groups have attempted to
obscure their identities and activities in public.85
Other scholars, such as Elizabeth Joh, John Gilliom, and Ryan Calo
have documented some of the ways in which individuals resist
surveillance in diverse contexts, and begun to investigate the
importance of these acts.86 As Joh has explained, efforts to obscure are
often not a means of hiding criminal activity (frequently there is no
criminal activity), but instead merely an effort to express protest — to
communicate to the state that they could not and should not
observe.87 However, for Joh, the value of privacy protests appears
limited to (1) highlighting whether a particular form of surveillance is
necessary and (2) demonstrating shifting privacy norms; that is, that

83 See, e.g., NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY vii (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1971) (“The products of modern technology and some of the direct and indirect
effects of mass society combine to enhance [privacy’s] scarcity value.”); Froomkin,
supra note 2, at 1468-501 (cataloguing privacy-invading technologies); Strandburg,
Home, Home on the Web, supra note 20, at 626 (arguing that technology threatens
privacy by enhancing the methods for invading traditionally private areas, and by
creating more opportunities for intrusion through “technology-mediated social”
interactions); cf. HARCOURT, supra note 73, at 7 (arguing that social media has become
a surveillance dragnet).
84 See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 81, at 200-01 (observing the ways in which the
state disciplines and controls populations through surveillance).
85 See, e.g., GILLIOM, supra note 55, at 6 (documenting how those receiving welfare
and subject to its surveillance “build a critique of surveillance that is based in the
realities and demands of everyday life”); Gilliom, Struggling with Surveillance, supra
note 68, at 113 (observing that there is “a widespread pattern of unconventional
politics through which ordinary people can express and mobilize their opposition to
surveillance policies while at the same time achieving short-term gains that are
important in their daily lives” and listing as examples obscuring one’s license plate
with mud and using false names for supermarket frequent shopper programs);
Virginia Eubanks, Want to Predict the Future of Surveillance? Ask Poor Communities,
AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 15, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/want-predict-futuresurveillance-ask-poor-communities (“Resistance to surveillance is as common as
surveillance itself.”).
86 See GILLIOM, supra note 55, at 6; Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?,
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 30-31 (2016); Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance
Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 1000-02 (2013); see
also Finn Brunton & Helen Nissenbaum, Vernacular Resistance to Data Collection and
Analysis: A Political Theory of Obfuscation, FIRST MONDAY (May 2, 2011), http://www.
firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3493/2955 (documenting the practice
of obfuscation as a form of resistance against data collection whereby individuals
deliberating create false data to confuse or delay data collectors).
87 Joh, supra note 86, at 1002.
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people do expect privacy.88 Joh’s focus appears limited to the Fourth
Amendment, and she downplays any First Amendment role in
protecting privacy protests.89
Here, I add to existing discussions regarding surveillance resistance
not only by identifying and connecting additional examples of such
resistance, but more importantly by situating these examples within
performative, post-structural theory, which, in turn, helps uncover
privacy’s expressive dimension. In other words, part of my
contribution is in demonstrating that there is expressive power in
maintaining one’s anonymity or privacy against an ever-watching
surveillance regime, and highlighting the social impact of those
privacy performances.
Examples of such performative privacy are not uncommon and I
explore four of them in detail. These real world examples buttress the
theoretical account provided in the preceding Section, and vice versa.
Importantly, these examples do not necessarily illustrate performative
privacy in exactly the same ways. That is, there are variations in how
functional demands for privacy serve as acts of performative
expression. But rather than detracting from this Article’s theory of
performative privacy, the subtle differences in the way performative
privacy operates in the context of hoodies, cyber masks, gender
expression, and head veils helps highlight the concept’s potency and
potential breadth.
Nor am I suggesting that all people who engage in functional efforts
to maintain public privacy are enacting an expressive message at all
times. People can seek privacy for lots of reasons. But this Article’s
purpose is to show how those functional acts are frequently
expressive.
1.

Hoodies

The hoodie has evolved from a functional apparel item to an iconic
symbol of resistance that simultaneously obscures one’s unique
identity. The hoodie, by providing a level of privacy while in public, is
increasingly worn as an expression of resistance against the

88

Id. at 1022-23.
Id. at 1005 n.38; see id. at 1023. Similarly, while Ryan Calo has noted the
importance of citizen resistance to surveillance, he does not appear sanguine about the
prospect of legal protections for that resistance. Calo, supra note 86, at 36-39. Nor
does Gilliom meaningfully explore doctrinal protections for the resistance he so
importantly documents. See GILLIOM, supra note 55, at 6-7.
89
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government. A brief history helps illustrate the hoodie’s expressive
pedigree and current performative role.90
In the 1970s, the hoodie was worn by graffiti artists to help them
“keep a low profile” while engaged in graffiti.91 The hoodie was
subsequently adopted by hip-hop, skate, and punk cultures —
cultures that shared perhaps reciprocal antipathy with mainstream
society. As such, “the hoodie was further interwoven with a culture of
defiance.”92 As this history suggests, the hoodie has often been worn
by individuals engaged in expressive mediums (e.g., graffiti, music).93
Over time, the hoodie’s ability to cloak individuals became
expressive in and of itself as a sign of resistance. As author and poet
Jarrett Neal articulated in his collection What Color is Your Hoodie,
“[a]t various times in our lives we all cloak ourselves in the same
metaphorical hoodie whether the forces of our inequitable society
impose it upon us or we conceal ourselves in it of our own free will,
an act of rebellion or survival.”94 In addition to this descriptive
90 As noted, this is not to say everyone who wears a hoodie is engaged in an act of
expressive resistance. People wear hoodies for myriad reasons (warmth, comfort, etc.).
But the hoodie is sometimes worn as a form of surveillance resistance. And even in
instances where not worn for that purpose, it may be understood by the state and other
surveilling actors as a form of resistance — highlighting its expressive role and, as will
be outlined in Part III, the arguable invalidity of attempts to target, strip, and
criminalize efforts to conceal oneself in public. See ALISON KINNEY, HOOD 7 (2016)
(explaining that everyone wears hoods, but hoods nonetheless provoke responses,
including legislative responses). More broadly, as surveillance scholar Kirstie Ball has
observed, particularly in a world of big data, individuals may not be fully conscious of
interacting with particular surveillance practices and, yet, their information is
gathered and their bodies are read. Ball, supra note 72, at 67; cf. MCGRATH, supra note
60, at 100 (explaining that certain people may be unaware of the perlocutionary or
performative effects of an act, does not negate those performative effects). As such
(and important for the First Amendment analysis), the valence of a specific intent to
express resistance at a particular point seems diminished. An internalized or
routinized form of resistance may be more effective, and speak more loudly, than any
self-conscious effort. Cf. HOY, supra note 65, at 10-11 (explaining that for many
critical theorists, “although resistance should not be blind, agents need not know
explicitly all their reasons and principles in advance”).
91 Denis Wilson, The History of the Hoodie, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 3, 2012),
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-history-of-the-hoodie-20120403.
92 Id.
93 Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music is one of
the oldest forms of human expression.”); Margaret L. Mettler, Note, Graffiti Museum:
A First Amendment Argument for Protecting Uncommissioned Art on Private Property,
111 MICH. L. REV. 249, 249-51 (2012) (documenting graffiti’s expressive function).
94 JARRETT NEAL, WHAT COLOR IS YOUR HOODIE? 163 (2015). Neal goes on to
describe how a hoodie can signify the “halo of an avenging angel,” the “cape of a
superhero,” or the “mythic cloak of invisibility.” Id. at 165. Similarly, in his recent
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account, an empirical study of students at three British schools
revealed that some students would actively resist CCTV surveillance
cameras by putting up their hoods to avoid detection.95
And it is in part because the hoodie is a functional and yet
expressive form of resistance to surveillance, adopted by multiple
iconoclastic groups, that the hoodie is viewed with suspicion by state
actors and others in positions of authority. Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati have explained that, “as a matter of both socialization and
formal or informal political advice, African Americans are encouraged
to signal cooperation by giving up their privacy” when confronted by
law enforcement.96 The hoodie can signal, particularly for black
communities who are disproportionately targeted for state
surveillance, a lack of cooperation with surveillance efforts and the
assertion of control and privacy over one’s identity and body.97 Indeed,
some have suggested that it was Trayvon Martin’s hoodie (coupled
with his race) that prompted George Zimmerman to become
suspicious of, and ultimately kill, the young, unarmed teenager.98 This
is not to say that race played no role in Martin’s killing or violence
against black individuals — just the opposite.99 Rather, it is to suggest
that it is in part because black bodies are disproportionately subjected
to surveillance and structural oppression that the wearing of a hoodie
shielding those bodies can take on an hyper-expressive tenor — one of
refusal to be surveilled.100
book, Ta-Nehisi Coates tells the story of how the mother of a black boy killed by the
police extolled Coates’s son that “You matter. You have value. You have every right to
wear your hoodie, to play your music as loud as you want. You have every right to be
you. And no one should deter you from being you.” COATES, supra note 69, at 113.
95 Michael McCahill & Rachel Finn, The Social Impact of Surveillance in Three UK
Schools: ‘Angels’, ‘Devils’ and ‘Teen Mums,’ 7 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 273, 283-84 (2010);
see also HARCOURT, supra note 73, at 278 (discussing the McCahill & Finn findings).
96 CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 62, at 102.
97 Cf. id. at 102-03.
98 See, e.g., COATES, supra note 69, at 130 (explaining that dominant discourse
suggested that “Trayvon Martin’s hoodie got him killed”); Brian Palmer, When Did
Hoodlums Start Wearing Hoods?, SLATE (Mar. 22, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/03/trayvon_martin_killing_when_did_
hoods_become_associated_with_illicit_activity_.html (“Martin was wearing a hooded
sweatshirt on the night he was killed, and it may have led Zimmerman to describe him
as a ‘real suspicious guy’ to a 911 operator.”).
99 Cf. Camille Gear Rich, Angela Harris and the Racial Politics of Masculinity:
Trayvon Martin, George Zimmerman, and the Dilemmas of Desiring Whiteness, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1047 (2014) (positing that the tragic killing of Martin arose not
only from racial dynamics, but out of Zimmerman’s social desire for white, racialized
masculinity) [hereinafter Angela Harris and Racial Politics].
100 See Nguyen, supra note 81, at 791 (noting that Martin’s friend, Rachel Jeantel,
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Ta-Nehisi Coates’s contemporary description of the degree to which
black bodies are targeted for surveillance and control is the most
direct, and among the most powerful: “white America is a syndicate
arrayed to protect its exclusive power to dominate and control [black]
bodies.”101 Coates’s moving account of the violence visited upon black
bodies echoes that of James Baldwin and many others.102 Surveillance
— the erosion of public privacy — plays a prominent part in this
syndicate.103 A prime example of the role of surveillance in the toolbox
of control over racial minorities is New York City’s “stop-and-frisk”
program, wherein black and Latino people were targeted on public
streets for police questioning, detention, and often body frisks.104 Put
simply, to the extent that the physical bodies of black and Latino
people are the targets of abuse and subjugation, the privacy barrier
provided by the hoodie can serve the dual role of shielding and
told Martin to pull up his hoodie because he was being followed); cf. Rashawn Ray, “If
Only He Didn’t Wear a Hoodie . . . “ Selective Perception and Stereotype Maintenance, in
GETTING REAL ABOUT RACE 81, 83-86 (Stephanie M. McClure & Cherise A. Harris eds.,
2015) (arguing that to the extent Martin’s hoodie motivated Zimmerman, it was
because it was associated with his blackness — Zimmerman’s primary motivator).
101 COATES, supra note 69, at 42; see also Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Hard Truths
of Ta-Nehisi Coates, N.Y. MAG. (July 12, 2015, 9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2015/07/ta-nehisi-coates-between-the-world-and-me.html (describing the
vulnerability of black bodies as the “main theme” of Black Lives Matter protests and
Coates’s writings).
102 See, e.g., JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 33-34 (1963) (recounting how
“[w]hen I was ten, and didn’t look, certainly, any older, two policemen amused
themselves with me by frisking me, making comic (and terrifying) speculations
concerning my ancestry and probable sexual prowess, and for good measure, leaving
me flat on my back in one of Harlem’s empty lots.”); BELL HOOKS, WE REAL COOL:
BLACK MEN AND MASCULINITY 68 (2004) (lamenting the “ritual[ized] sexualized torture
of the black body” throughout American history); see also BILLIE HOLIDAY, STRANGE
FRUIT (Commodore 1939) (“Here is fruit for the crows to pluck, For the rain to
gather, for the wind to suck, For the sun to rot, for the trees to drop, Here is a strange
and bitter crop.”).
103 Cf. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1326-27 (2008)
(documenting the state’s “desire to preventatively regulate” individuals through
innovative surveillance technologies, rather than physical restraint). Indeed, the state
views the black body itself as expressive and symbolic and targets those bodies for
surveillance, and worse. See Coleman, supra note 31, at 305 (“The black body has
been and continues to be hugely symbolic and representative of disorder for state and
corporate servants — just take current stop and search figures as one indicator of this.
This body continues to be a site for the enactment of brutalising violence.”).
104 Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (observing that
over 80% of the 4.4 million “stop and frisk” detentions made by NYPD between 2004
and 2012 were of black or Hispanic individuals). The program was ruled
unconstitutional because it was being applied in a racially discriminatory manner in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 562.
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concealing the body from the surveillance regime and communicating
resistance to that same regime.105
Additional support for this Article’s contention that the state views
hoodies or other privacy-enhancing clothes as expressive and, from
the state’s perspective, “intimidating” can be found in the very
existence of certain local laws that actually criminalize wearing of a
hoodie or mask while in public.106 For example, Georgia’s criminal
code provides that “[a] person is guilty of a misdemeanor when [she
or] he wears a mask, hood, or device by which any portion of the face
is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the
wearer and is upon any public way or public property.”107 The state
recognizes the hoodie — simply by being worn — as a form of
expressive resistance.108 As Ruthann Robson has noted, “the mask is
105 Cf. COATES, supra note 69, at 14-17 (documenting how certain apparel items
served as “armor” against social structures that rendered the black body “naked” to
the world through, for example, stop-and-frisk policies).
106 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.735 (2017) (“A person whose identity is concealed
by the person in a public place by means of a robe, mask, or other disguise, unless
based on religious beliefs, or incidental to amusement, entertainment, protection from
weather, or medical treatment, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1412.7 (2017) (“No person or persons at least 16 years of age shall, while wearing any
mask, hood or device whereby the person, face or voice is disguised so as to conceal
the identity of the wearer, enter, be or appear upon any lane, walkway, alley, street,
road, highway or other public way in this State.”); Stephen J. Simoni, Note, “Who Goes
There?” — Proposing a Model Anti-Mask Act, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 241, 242-43 (1992)
(collecting and comparing anti-mask laws which prohibit mere concealment of
identity, with those that forbid mask-wearing during the commission of a crime).
107 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-38 (2017). The Georgia statute survived a First
Amendment challenge, although the Georgia Supreme Court narrowed the statute to
apply only to mask-wearing conduct that “provokes a reasonable apprehension of
intimidation, threats or violence.” State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552 (Ga. 1990).
Ironically, several anti-mask laws were originally passed in order to target and
criminalize the intimidating conduct of the Ku Klux Klan. Wayne R. Allen, Note, Klan,
Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819, 82127 (1991). The laws have more recently been seemingly used to target racial minorities.
See Mark Joseph Stern, Oklahoma Republican Proposes Bill Banning Hoodies in Public,
SLATE (Jan. 12, 2015, 2:53 PM) [hereinafter Bill Banning Hoodies], http://www.
slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/01/12/hoodie_ban_oklahoma_republican_proposes_bill
_to_outlaw_wearing_hoods_in.html (explaining that Oklahoma’s proposed hoodie-ban
was in response to protests over Trayvon Martin’s killing). Other political protestors
have been targeted, as well. See Noah Feldman, The Constitution Has Masked Protestors
Covered, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-0302/the-constitution-has-masked-protesters-covered (discussing new North Dakota laws
targeting masks worn by Dakota Access Pipeline protestors).
108 See Nguyen, supra note 81, at 802 (explaining that “because it hides,
camouflages . . . the hoodie (and its racial, colonial sister-other, the hijab) becomes
itself a criminal, even legally outlawed in some public places as a mobile border zone,
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prohibited because of what it conveys.”109 Put similarly by Margot
Kaminski in her exceptionally thorough analysis of anti-mask laws,
the anonymity provided by head and face coverings “is often seen as
inherently threatening.”110 Coverings are viewed by the state and its
agents as a threat and criminalized.111
As another example, members of the group Anonymous, which
works to undermine government surveillance (among other
initiatives), often wear Guy Fawkes masks.112 That the privacy
obstructing the security powers that wish to see the body-as-information more
perfectly”); Stern, Bill Banning Hoodies, supra note 107 (observing that hoodies
function as “symbolic speech” and that the Oklahoma “bill is clearly aiming to hinder
the power of such protests by outlawing one of their most powerful symbolic tools: a
single piece of clothing”).
109 RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, AND
DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 125 (2013).
110 Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case
Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815,
830 (2013). As Kaminski documents, anti-mask statutes “vary widely in what
behavior they criminalize.” Id. at 848. And courts have varied in their interpretation
and treatment of anti-mask regulations, differing in their determinations of whether
wearing a mask in violation of an anti-mask statute constitutes symbolic speech or
simply conduct. Id. at 854-73. Compare Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 90-92
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that masks used to protest the Shah of Iran were symbolic
speech and had “become a symbol of opposition to” the Shah), and Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan v. Martin Luther King Jr. Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745, 751 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (“In the context of parades and demonstrations, certain masks and disguises
may constitute strong symbolic political expression that is afforded protection by the
First Amendment.”), with Ryan v. Cty. of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1095-96 (7th Cir.
1995) (concluding that wearing of anti-filtration mask in courthouse communicates
intimidation and, at the same time, that the mask was not symbolic speech).
Sometimes the determination seems to hinge on the nature of the mask (i.e., is it worn
in a parade, is it a Guy Fawkes mask?). The concept of performative privacy helps
highlight how a broader array of masks or hoodies ought to be considered expressive
because, even if they are bland, they may express resistance and opposition to the
surveillance regime.
111 Cf. NEAL, supra note 94, at 163 (arguing that Trayvon Martin’s hoodie “falsely
marked him as a thug, a threat” — that is, it was interpreted as expressive by
Zimmerman and the power structures he represented). There may be a legitimate lawenforcement purpose for a law seeking to prevent those committing crimes from
wearing masks. But often the anti-masks laws are untethered to any legitimate law
enforcement purpose — they apply broadly and are not limited to those engaged in
wrongdoing. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:313 (2017).
112 Euclides Montes, The V for Vendetta Mask: A Political Sign of the Times,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2011/sep/10/v-for-vendetta-mask (“[T]he [Guy Fawkes] mask offers [Anonymous] at
once a political symbol that provides anonymity. And therein lies the symbol’s
increasing popularity, imbued with a political aura while simultaneously offering the
comfort (and depending on your activities, the safety) of secrecy.”). The expressive
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afforded by face coverings can itself express resistance is clear from the
fact that several Occupy Wall Street protestors were issued citations
for violating New York’s anti-mask/hood law in 2011.113 The
government’s own response to the masks highlights their inherent
expressive content — the government finds the concealment
expressive and intimidating and uses its own reaction to the
expressive masks to justify stripping individuals of privacy.114 And the
Supreme Court has deemed ex ante state determinations that particular
expressive conduct is intimidating to be unconstitutional regulation of
speech.115
Similarly, the empirical study of British school children that
documented instances where hoods were worn as an expression of
resistance documented other instances where students would take
their hoods down specifically because they knew that donning it up
would mark them for additional surveillance — the hoodie would be
read as expressing resistance.116
The expressive power of attempts at physical obfuscation is further
highlighted by artistic public privacy endeavors. Principally, artist
Adam Harvey has explored and developed methods for avoiding facial
recognition software through makeup and hair styles — a project
power of privacy as a form of resistance is also communicated by the group’s name —
Anonymous.
113 Sean Gardiner & Jessica Firger, Rare Charge is Unmasked, WALL STREET J., (Sept.
20, 2011, at A17; Ruthann Robson, Loitering While Masked: The Wall Street Protest
Arrests, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (Sept. 22, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
conlaw/2011/09/loitering-while-masked-wall_street-protests.html.
114 See, e.g., State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508, 514 (W. Va. 1996) (in upholding an
anti-mask statute, concluding that “[t]he obvious governmental interest here is the
protection of citizens from violence and from the fear and intimidation of being
confronted by someone whom they cannot identify”); cf. D.C. CODE § 22-3312.03(a)(b) (2017) (penalizing wearing of mask “[w]ith the intent to intimidate”); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 34 (2017) (criminalizing wearing of disguise with intent to
“intimidate . . . an officer or other person in the lawful performance of his [or her]
duty”).
115 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366-67 (2003) (O’Connor, J., plurality
opinion) (finding a Virginia statute that declared cross burning prima facie evidence
of intent to intimidate unconstitutional because it ignored contextual factors that
could render a cross burning non-intimidating).
116 See McCahill & Finn, supra note 95, at 284 (documenting that “one pupil tried
not to ‘raise the red flag’ by avoiding walking ‘round wiv my hood up . . . even if it’s
raining because they [security guards] look at you real dodgy’, while another said ‘if
I’ve got my hood up and I go into a shop, I’ll take it down before’” (citations
omitted)); see also CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 62, at 18 (suggesting that black
individuals may “avoid wearing hoodies” as part of their identity performances in
order to avoid increased scrutiny from law enforcement).
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called CV Dazzle.117 The techniques attempt to change the lighting
contrast and space between features, disrupting surveillance software’s
ability to detect a face. Harvey labels CV Dazzle as a form of
“expressive interference” — the make-up and hairstyles gain political
meaning and texture because they are designed to thwart facial
recognition surveillance.118 In a new, related project, Harvey has
designed clothing designed to mimic the patterns that facial
recognition technology interprets as a face in order to confuse and
subvert the technology.119 Harvey also created a Camoflash AntiPaparrazi Clutch, which detects camera flashes and then emits its own
high-powered light burst capable of overexposing the sensor of the
camera, obscuring the subject of the photo and holder of the
Clutch.120 The Clutch — modeled after a fashion accessory — literally
emits an expressive light message that disrupts the attempt to
surveil.121 Harvey has also created a line of hoodies and veils made of
fabrics that block the thermal imaging sometimes done by UAVs or
drones. He dubbed this apparel “Stealth Wear.”122 To Harvey, the
apparel is both functionally privacy-enhancing and symbolic;
communicative.123 It “aims to make a tech statement.”124
In sum, while Harvey’s quite self-conscious projects are more
obviously an expressive form of resistance to surveillance, part of this
Article’s purpose is to illustrate how even quotidian,125 ordinary forms
117 See Adam R. Harvey, CV Dazzle: Camouflage from Computer Vision, AH
PROJECTS, https://ahprojects.com/projects/cv-dazzle/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
118 See Adam Harvey, How to Hide from Machines, DIS MAGAZINE, http://
dismagazine.com/dystopia/evolved-lifestyles/8115/anti-surveillance-how-to-hide-frommachines/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
119 Alex Hern, Anti-Surveillance Clothing Aims to Hide Wearers from Facial
Recognition, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2017, 2:00 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2017/jan/04/anti-surveillance-clothing-facial-recognition-hyperface.
120 See Adam R. Harvey, Camoflash, AH PROJECTS, https://ahprojects.com/projects/
camoflash/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
121 See id.
122 See Adam R. Harvey, Stealth Wear, AH PROJECTS, https://ahprojects.com/projects/
stealth-wear/#summary (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
123 See Tim Maly, Anti-Drone Camouflage: What to Wear in Total Surveillance, WIRED
(Jan. 17, 2013, 3:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/01/anti-drone-camouflage-apparel/.
124 Jenna Wortham, Stealth Wear Aims to Make a Tech Statement, N.Y. TIMES (June
29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/technology/stealth-wear-aims-to-makea-tech-statement.html.
125 See MCGRATH, supra note 60, at viii (“While art and theatre work responding to
surveillance society can help us exist productively in this world, it is still the banal
experience of day-to-day footage and data that defines our encounter with
surveillance.”).
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of functionally maintaining privacy in public spaces are more than just
functional — they are often expressive.126 As outlined above, the
government often views the sartorial choice of a hoodie (and masks)
as a form of resistance — views it as intimidating because it is
interfering with surveillance — and therefore targets such privacyenhancing efforts with specific criminal sanctions. And, drawing from
the post-structural theory outlined in Part II.A., the expressive power
of hoodies, masks, and outré forms of physical obfuscation gain
additional volume precisely because the surveillance regimes have
made privacy and anonymity such a scare social resource. Purposeful
wearing of identity-shielding apparel, and the state’s reaction to that
apparel, helps reveal the true scope of surveillance, and illuminates a
mode of doctrinally-protected expressive opposition.
2.

Cyber Masks

The physical world is, of course, not the only “public” realm policed
and surveilled. The virtual world is also under observation. Perhaps
even more so than the physical world. And as with efforts to mask
one’s physical identity, efforts to maintain online and cellular privacy,
anonymity, or obscurity are also often acts of performative privacy
intended to express resistance to prevailing surveillance norms. Like
hoodies or other physical face coverings, technologies and tactics
designed to obfuscate online activity also communicate. What I dub
“cyber masks” shield the wearer’s identity and activities but also
express a particular, outward-facing message.
As noted in Part II.A, the online world is structured such that in
order to “live” and participate online, one has to exchange or
surrender one’s privacy. In opposition to this dominate form of social
participation sit those who obfuscate or hide their online movements
through sometimes simple and other times elaborate techniques. Finn
Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum’s recent book, Obfuscation: A User’s
Guide for Privacy and Protest, collects and highlights several of the
obfuscation techniques currently being used to avoid online or cellular
surveillance.127 Such tactics include, among many others,
TrackMeNot, which is designed to prevent profiling of users based on
126 In this way, this Article’s identification of widespread, culturally diverse forms of
“performative privacy” helps respond to critiques of aestheticized counter surveillance
resistance, such as Harvey’s, that according to critics does not account for how
surveillance’s harms are disproportionately felt by marginalized communities. See, e.g.,
Torin Monahan, The Right to Hide? Anti-Surveillance Camouflage and the Aestheticization
of Resistance, 12 COMMC’N & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 159, 160-62 (2015).
127 BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 74.
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their internet search queries by interspersing genuine queries with
automated queries, making the individual’s authentic activity more
difficult for the search engine to discern, profile, and target.128
Another relatively prominent internet obfuscation method is the use
of Tor relays.129 At a most basic level, Tor helps conceal internet
activity by passing the activity through a series of relays such that
when a user accesses a particular web page, the request is not directly
linked to the user’s IP address but with an exit node.130 As Brunton
and Nissenbaum explain, the “labyrinth of relays” is strengthened by
the number of users who volunteer to serve as relays in the chain of
obfuscation.131 Relatedly, danah boyd has documented how teenagers
living public, networked lives actively attempt “to achieve [privacy] in
spite of structural or social barriers that make it difficult to do so.”132
They do this, in part, through what boyd and Alice Marwick call
“social steganography.”133 Aware that their online conversations may
be read by adults, teens deploy inside jokes, nicknames, or code words
to share information that cannot be understood by surveilling parents
or others.134 In this way, they mask or obfuscate the underlying
meaning of their conversations.
Obfuscation techniques such as TrackMeNot, Tor, and their many
cousins,135 certainly serve the purpose of providing some functional
level of privacy or obscurity. And they certainly serve as a form of
code, enabling communication.136 But they can serve the dual purpose
of “expressing protest.”137 Many obfuscation techniques serve “to
128

Id. at 13-14.
See Tor Metrics, TOR PROJECT, https://metrics.torproject.org/ (last visited Nov.
28, 2016) (describing Tor as “the largest deployed anonymity network to date” and
providing statistics on its scope).
130 See Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016) (explaining that “[t]o create a private network pathway with
Tor, the user’s software or client incrementally builds a circuit of encrypted connections
through relays on the network.”).
131 BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 74, at 20.
132 DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 60
(2014).
133 Id. at 65-66.
134 Id.
135 See Joh, supra note 86, at 1000-01 (cataloging surveillance defense mechanisms
including encryption, disposable phone numbers, and ad hoc Faraday cages, among
others).
136 See MCGRATH, supra note 60, at 218-19.
137 BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 74, at 4; see also id. at 59 (“Obfuscation can
serve a function akin to the hidden transcript, concealing dissent and covert speech
and providing an opportunity to assert one’s sense of autonomy — an act of refusal
129
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register discontent and refusal.”138 And that discontent is with the
structures of surveillance.139
As with the physical world, the prevailing structural norm online is
that one’s privacy is surrendered or taken (depending on your
perspective). The existence of that structural modus operandi means
that any oppositional effort to maintain privacy within that structure is
amplified — the expressive component of cyber masks gains
amplification in part because of the prevailing norm of privacy
surrender.140
The expressive nature of “cyber masks” is brought into relief by the
fact that, as with physical hoodies or masks, the government responds
to cyber masks with additional scrutiny and surveillance. As the
Snowden leaks revealed, “[t]he online anonymity network Tor is a
high-priority target for the National Security Agency.”141 There is also
evidence that the NSA tracks anyone who uses an anonymous email
service, MixMinion; or employs a privacy enhancing operating system,
Tails; and may even target anyone who searches the internet for
privacy tools.142 In the wake of attacks by the Islamic State in Paris in
November 2015, law enforcement’s targeting of encryption users has
also taken on a more public role.143 Indeed, there are reports that an
concealed within a gesture of assent — or can provide more straightforward tools for
protest or obscurity.”); Daniel C. Howe, Surveillance Countermeasures: Expressive
Privacy Via Obfucation, 4:1 APRJA (2015), http://www.aprja.net/surveillancecountermeasures-expressive-privacy-via-obfuscation (explaining that obfuscation
tools are “expressive technologies” in that “they exist not only to serve some
instrumental function, but always also to amplify social, cultural or political
perspectives”).
138 Id. at 90. In fact, according to surveillance studies scholar Torin Monahan,
although countersurveillance practitioners may have short term practical goals, “they
are foremost engaged in acts of symbolic resistance.” MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 130.
139 See HARCOURT, supra note 73, at 270-71 (describing Tor and other encryption
and anonymity tools as weapons of resistance used to “fog up that plastic cube in
which we are trapped”).
140 See supra Part II.A.
141 Bruce Schneier, Attacking Tor: How the NSA Targets Users’ Online Anonymity,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 10:50 AM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity; see also Jason Koebler, How the NSA (or
Anyone Else) Can Crack Tor’s Anonymity, MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 19, 2014, 7:00 AM EST),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-the-nsa-or-anyone-else-can-crack-tors-anonymity;
cf. Calo, supra note 86, at 38 (“If encryption is not usable, or at any rate, if it is not widely
used, then those who do use encryption can wind up as targets . . . .”).
142 See Kim Zetter, The NSA is Targeting Users of Privacy Services, Leaked Code
Shows, WIRED (July 3, 2014 5:45 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/07/nsa-targetsusers-of-privacy-services/.
143 See Haley Sweetland Edwards, Can Silicon Valley Help Beat ISIS?, TIME (Nov. 19,
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increasing number of government employees are turning to encrypted
messaging software, such as Signal or Confide, to protect their
conversations and that those in positions of authority understand the
use of encryption to be a statement of resistance.144 More broadly,
Gary Marx has described how systems of surveillance and efforts to
neutralize that surveillance are, in effect, engaged in a dialectical back
and forth — a game of cat and mouse.145 And that game is an
expressive, communicative one.
3.

Gender Expression

Efforts to obtain equal rights for transgender individuals sometimes
involve the twin goals of guaranteeing a right to “gender expression”
while at the same time ensuring that transgender individuals have the
ability to keep their trans status private, should they see fit.146 In this
2015), http://time.com/4119951/encryption-can-silicon-valley-help/ (noting that
national-security officials are increasingly concerned about encryption technologies).
To a degree, Apple’s recent stand against being forced to create a back door enabling
law enforcement to subvert phone encryption, and the public praise Apple received,
also reflects the expressive value of encryption. See Editorial, Why Apple Is Right to
Challenge an Order to Help the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/why-apple-is-right-to-challenge-an-order-to-help-thefbi.html.
144 Jeff John Roberts, Trump’s Press Secretary Targets Messaging Apps in Leak
Crackdown, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/27/spicer-phonechecks/ (discussing Sean Spicer’s “phone check” of staffers and prohibition from using
secure messaging apps such as Signal and Confide).
145 Gary T. Marx, Opinion, A Tack in the Shoe and Taking Off the Shoe:
Neutralization and Counter-Neutralization Dynamics, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 294, 29599 (2009); see also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 167-169 (2007) (agreeing with
Marx that everyday acts of resistance to surveillance do occur with some frequency).
146 See, e.g., Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31591, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (“Transgender is ‘[a]n
umbrella term that may be used to describe people whose gender expression does not
conform to cultural norms and/or whose gender identity is different from their sex
assigned at birth. Transgender is a self-identity, and some gender nonconforming
people do not identify with this term.’” (alteration in original) (quoting TRANS BODIES,
TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 620 (Laura EricksonSchroth, ed. 2014))). While recent public attention has been brought to the existence
and importance of people who are transgender, in discussing transgender rights it is
equally important not to ignore identities that do not fit neatly into “new” categories
being socially and legally enshrined. See MAGGIE NELSON, THE ARGONAUTS 52-53
(2015) (“‘[T]rans’ may work well enough as a shorthand, but the quickly developing
mainstream narrative it evokes (‘born into the wrong body,’ necessitating an
orthopedic pilgrimage between two fixed destinations) is useless for some . . . ? [F]or
some, ‘transitioning’ may mean leaving one gender entirely behind, while for
others . . . it doesn’t?”). Indeed, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick observed, “no matter what

2017]

Performative Privacy

1709

way, transgender individuals are often engaged in performative privacy
— they express or perform their gender identity which, in turn, may
keep aspects of their biology, medical history, and administrative sex
classification hidden.147
As with racial minorities, surveillance and policing of gender nonconforming people has been extensively documented and affectingly
described.148 The harms of surveillance are particularly acute for those
who are both gender non-conforming and racial minorities.149 Predating the advent of contemporary administrative proposals for
policing transgender identities (such as restrictive laws for changing
one’s gender marker on a birth certificate or banning transgender
access to bathrooms comporting with one’s gender identity), the state
and police have surveilled, criminalized, and harassed transgender
individuals.150 As Eric Stanley puts it, “[t]rans/gender-non-conforming
and queer people, along with many others, are born into webs of
surveillance.”151
Examples of the performative privacy rightfully demanded by
transgender individuals can be seen in the context of opposition to
laws that forcibly out trans people to potential employers, or laws
which out a person’s trans status when attempting to use public
restrooms.152 For instance, some jurisdictions require that in order for
cultural construction, women and men are more like each other than chalk is like
cheese.” Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Queer and Now, in TENDENCIES 1, 7 (Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick ed., 1993).
147 That gender is performed does not suggest that it is in any way inauthentic.
148 See, e.g., Wesley Ware, Rounding Up the Homosexuals: The Impact of Juvenile
Court on Queer and Trans/Gender-Non-Conforming Youth, in CAPTIVE GENDERS: TRANS
EMBODIMENT AND THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 77, 78 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat Smith
eds., 2011) (documenting the policing of gender and sexuality in juvenile courts and
describing one example where a black lesbian was repeatedly arrested anytime the
perpetrator was described as a “boyish-looking” girl).
149 Cf. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (arguing in favor of an intersectional understanding of
how people may be multiply-burdened).
150 See, e.g., Eric A. Stanley, Fugitive Flesh, in CAPTIVE GENDERS: TRANS EMBODIMENT
AND THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 1, 1 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat Smith eds., 2011)
(recounting how in 1969 New York City police would enter clubs, line up and check
all gender-non-conforming people to ensure that people “were wearing the legally
mandated three pieces of ‘gender appropriate clothing’”).
151 Id. at 7.
152 For a discussion of how the panoptic architecture of modern lavatories itself
exposes gender non-conforming individuals, see SHEILA L. CAVANAGH, QUEERING
BATHROOMS 81 (2010) (arguing that Canadian and American public restrooms “are
voyeuristic spaces functioning to incite wonder and intrigue while maintaining a
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an individual to change their gender marker on their birth certificate
or driver’s license, an individual must first present medical
documentation indicating that they have undergone gender
confirmation surgery (sometimes referred to as sex reassignment
surgery).153 For the many who are unable or choose not to undergo
surgery,154 such laws publicly out sensitive, intimate information to
the public, including potential employers, who note the discord
between the person’s ID and gender presentation.155 In response,
transgender individuals have argued that they have a right to privacy
over their transgender identity and a concomitant right to publicly live
consistent with their true gender identity.156
Similarly, in a number of states over the last two years, so-called
“bathroom bills” or “papers-to-pee” laws have been proposed, and in
some instances (e.g., North Carolina), enacted.157 Certain iterations of
pretense (however dubious) of privacy”).
153 See, e.g., LA. O.M.V. GENDER CHANGE/REASSIGNMENT POLICY § I 22.01 (2009)
(requiring “[a] medical statement signed by a physician stating that the applicant has
undergone a successful gender change/reassignment” in order to change the gender
marker on a driver’s license); Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and
Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government
Approach to Recognizing the Lives of Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373,
400-01 (2013) (documenting jurisdictions that require surgery in order to change the
gender marker on a birth certificate).
154 See Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for
Transgender Student Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 291 (2013) (“[M]edical
transition — particularly genital surgery — is not affordable, necessary, or appropriate
for all transgender people.”).
155 DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS,
AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 146 (2015) (“Possessing identity documents with incorrect
gender markets can identify people as transgender in the hiring process, exposing
them to discrimination. People whose identity documents do not match their selfunderstanding or appearance also face heightened vulnerability in interactions with
police and other public officials . . . .”).
156 See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 12, K.L. v. Alaska, No. 3AN-11-05431 CI (Alaska
Super. Ct., July 19, 2011) (challenging purported surgery requirement for changing
gender on Alaska driver’s license as a violation of privacy because it both “[r]estrict[s]
[plaintiff’s] personal autonomy and right to control her appearance” and [f]orc[es] the
involuntary disclosure of her sensitive, personal information”).
157 See Scott Skinner-Thompson, North Carolina Just Lost Some of Its Charm: There’s
No Way the Governor’s Backward Measures Legalizing Discrimination Against LGBT
Individuals Can Stand, SALON (Mar. 25, 2016, 11:57 AM UTC), http://www.salon.com/
2016/03/25/north_carolina_just_lost_some_of_its_charm_theres_no_way_the_governors
_backward_measures_legalizing_discrimination_against_lgbtq_individuals_can_stand/
(critiquing North Carolina’s House Bill 2, which excludes transgender individuals from
using bathrooms that do not correspond to the sex listed on one’s birth certificate); see
also Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom Bill” Legislative Tracking, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislative-
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these bills would penalize transgender people for using restrooms
inconsistent with the sex they were assigned at birth or inconsistent
with an identification document.158 As outlined above, accurate
identification documents may be difficult to obtain because of onerous
surgery requirements.159 Some of the laws that have been proposed
would charge owners of public accommodations with enforcement of
the laws and punish those proprietors with fines for permitting
patrons to use the “wrong” restroom.160 And a ballot initiative
proposed in California would have imposed a $4,000 fine on any
government entity or person who permitted a person to use a restroom
inconsistent “with their sex as determined at birth, through medical
examination, or court judgment recognizing a change of gender.”161 In
opposition to these draconian laws, transgender rights advocates have
pointed out, among other arguments, both how they infringe on
tracking635951130.aspx (last updated Mar. 13, 2017) (listing currently pending
bathroom bills).
158 See Jana Kasperkevic, ‘Papers to Pee’: Texas, Kentucky and Florida Consider AntiTransgender Bills, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015, 9:30 PM EDT), http://www.theguardian.
com/society/2015/mar/24/papers-to-pee-texas-kentucky-and-florida-consider-antitransgender-bills; Scott Skinner-Thompson, Anti-Transgender Bathroom Bills Are
Unconstitutional, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2016, 12:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/
2016/02/11/anti_transgender_bathroom_bills_are_clearly_unconstitutional.html.
159 The significance of these bathroom regulations and their role as one of the next
battlegrounds for LGBTQ rights prompted one New York Times commentator to deem
2015 the “Year of the Toilet.” Jennifer Weiner, Opinion, The Year of the Toilet, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/opinion/the-year-of-thetoilet.html. But the laws are about much more than toilets; they involve questions
about whether society will recognize the existence of transgender lives and permit
transgender people to fully participate in public life. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch.
Bd., No. 16-1733, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6034, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2017) (“G.G.’s
case is about much more than bathrooms. It’s about a boy asking his school to treat
him just like any other boy. It’s about protecting the rights of transgender people in
public spaces and not forcing them to exist on the margins.”)
160 See, e.g., H.B. 583, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015) (“An owner of public
accommodations, a school, or a place of employment who maintains single-sex public
facilities and knowingly advertises, promotes, or encourages use of those facilities in
violation of subsection (2), or fails to take reasonable remedial measures after learning
of such use, is liable in a civil action to any person who is lawfully using those
facilities at the time of the unlawful entry for the damages caused by the unlawful
entry, together with reasonable attorney fees and costs.”).
161 Initiative 15-0019, Limits on Use of Facilities in Government Buildings
and Businesses (Cal. 2015), https://oag.ca.gov/initiatives/search?populate=15-0019.
Fortunately, in December 2015, Initiative 15-0019 failed to garner the requisite number of
signatures to qualify for the ballot. Steven Nelson, ‘Bathroom Police’ Initiative Fails to Make
California Ballot, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 22, 2015, 12:01 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/bathroom-police-initiative-fails-tomake-california-ballot.
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individuals’ ability to publicly live and express their true gender
identity and infringe on their privacy.162
Relatedly, students who argue that Title IX permits them to
participate on sex-segregated athletic teams consistent with their
gender identity are literally demanding the ability to perform in public
in a way that also permits them to potentially downplay or keep
private their sex assigned at birth.163
Certainly one could (and should) assert that an individual’s right to
express and live their gender identity is not necessarily contingent on
maintaining an element of privacy over the gender one was assigned
on a birth certificate or certain aspects of one’s anatomy. And for many
gender non-conforming people that is certainly the case, depending on
the context. That is, many people are open and rightly proud about
their transgender identity and make no qualms or efforts to pass as
cisgender.164 But even for those who are open as to their transgender
identity within certain confines, they may well reject forced revelation
of those intimate details in other contexts — for example, every time
they attempt to use a public restroom.

162 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, Carcano v. McCrory, No. 1:16-CV-00236TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C. April 21, 2016) (asserting constitutional informational privacy
claim); STUART BIEGEL, THE RIGHT TO BE OUT 190 (2010) (arguing that a student’s
access to the bathroom corresponding to their gender identity advances “the state’s
compelling interest in protecting the safety, equality, and privacy of all students”);
Civil Rights Coalition Ready to Launch Education Campaign Following Failed AntiTransgender Ballot Push, L.A. LGBT CTR. (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.lalgbtcenter.
org/civil_rights_coalition_ready_to_launch_education_campaign_following_failed_ant
i_transgender_ballot_push (quoting Dave Garcia, the Director of Public Policy and
Community Building for the Los Angeles LGBT Center as arguing that “[n]o one
should fear harassment, interrogation or a lawsuit simply for using the bathroom that
corresponds with their gender identity.”); Peeing in Peace: A Resource Guide for
Transgender Activists and Allies, TRANSGENDER L. CTR. (2005), https://transgenderlawcenter.
org/resources/public-accommodations/peeing-in-peace (last visited Feb. 14, 2017)
(emphasizing that sometimes the best strategy for avoiding confrontation or harassment
when using the bathroom corresponding to one’s gender identity is to try be as invisible as
possible).
163 See Skinner-Thompson & Turner, supra note 154, at 288, 297 (outlining the social
benefits of permitting trans students to participate on teams consistent with their gender
identity, and explaining how locker room related privacy concerns of both trans and
cisgender students can be accommodated); Scott Skinner-Thompson, The Department of
Education’s Common-Sense Approach to Transgender Inclusion, SLATE (Nov. 4, 2015, 10:42
AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/11/04/transgender_high_school_students_
a_curtain_can_make_a_difference.html (explaining that transgender privacy is part and
parcel of ensuring equal participation in school activities).
164 Someone is cisgender if they their self-identity is consistent with the gender
they were assigned at birth.
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As Ruthann Robson has explained, rightly or wrongly, “[t]he
doctrines that develop to elaborate constitutional rights are hierarchal
ones: rights of political expression are valued more highly than rights
of sexual expression.”165 Therefore, to the extent that claims for
gender expression are framed in terms of the politics of expression and
a refusal to be surveilled by the state, they may be on stronger
doctrinal and discursive footing, as elaborated more fully in Part III.166
In sum, many of the arguments raised by transgender rights
advocates sound simultaneously in a right to expression and a right to
privacy — they are, in some ways, demanding a right to performative
privacy, to be able to express one’s true identity publicly167 while
concealing other, potentially linked aspects of that identity. And the
importance of those gender and privacy performances cannot be
understated. As Butler explained: “There is no gender identity behind
the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted
by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”168 As such,
understanding the expressive, performative role of functional efforts to
maintain privacy (and providing protections for those expressions) is
critical to enabling the democratic constitution of privacy and gender
norms.
4.

Head Veils

Head coverings worn by some Muslim women can also serve as a
form of performative privacy. Without question, head coverings can
have multiple meanings, including independent religious and cultural
significance.169 Of course, sometimes they are worn for no religious
purpose at all.170 But historically and with renewed vigor, Western
165

ROBSON, supra note 109, at 2.
See infra Part III.
167 Cf. ROBSON, supra note 109, at 67 (“Clearly, prohibitions on gender
nonconforming sartorial choices implicate both equality and expressive constitutional
concerns.”); Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2000) (suggesting that minority identities are often
themselves expressive in part because they operate as a form of dissent); Nancy J.
Knauer, “Simply So Different”: The Uniquely Expressive Character of the Openly Gay
Individual After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 89 KY. L.J. 997, 1001 (2000-2001)
(arguing that because of heteronormative social structures, openly gay individuals’
identity operates as both expressive and politicized).
168 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at 33.
169 See generally FADWA EL GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE (DRESS,
BODY, CULTURE) (1999) (extensively documenting the role of the veil across history,
different countries and cultures, sexes, and religions).
170 For an illuminating discussion regarding the meaning of head scarves to both
166
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societies and governments have attempted to force Muslim women to
remove their veils. The veils have, in certain contexts, come to serve as
an expressive demand for, and claim to, modesty at the same time they
functionally provide a degree of privacy/modesty.171 And this is true
with regard to head coverings that leave the face exposed, such as a
hijab, or veils that cover the face or the whole body, such as a niqab or
burka.172
To reiterate, a head veil can be worn for many reasons — many of
which have nothing to do with privacy or religion.173 And, as with
hoodies or questions of gender expression, I would hesitate before
speculating why a particular individual decided to wear a veil.174 But
for present purposes — for the purposes of discerning the role of
performative privacy — it is significant and telling that governments
and corporations react to the wearing of head veils as if it were an
expressive demand for control over one’s body. That is, the veil is read
and interpreted by surveillance regimes as a form of expressive
resistance.175
Muslims and those, such as the French government, who seek to limit their use, see
generally JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL (2007) [hereinafter POLITICS
OF THE VEIL].
171 EL GUINDI, supra note 169, at xvii (explaining that at the end of the twentieth
century, veiling in certain Arab cultures “is largely about identity, largely about
privacy – of space and body,” and sometimes “symbolizes an element of power and
autonomy and functions as a vehicle for resistance,” but also observing that
conceptions of privacy are not consistent across cultures).
172 The fact that veils may not, in all instances, totally obscure the wearer’s identity
does not render them meaningless as privacy protections. As with hoodies, body and
face coverings still keep aspects of one’s identity secret — privacy is not all or nothing.
ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY 47 (2011) (“Clothing can conceal the precise look
and contours of a person’s body. Clothing can render age, sex, or race invisible.
Clothing can be a shelter, a cocoon, an emblem of reserve.”).
173 See JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES 70 (2007)
(noting that sociologists have “traced the range and variation in motives and meanings
attached to scarf-wearing” and that “these studies showed these motives and meanings
to be complex, to be quite different from one woman to the next, and to shift over a
lifetime”).
174 Id. at 78 (interviewing three women who “objected to efforts by others to attach
objective meanings to the voile”); see also Raja El Habti, Dir. Of Research, KARAMA,
THE VEIL CONTROVERSY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE, Panel
at The Brookings Center of the United States and Europe and the Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life (Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/
2004/4/19france/20040419.pdf (explaining that Muslim women “should have the right
to speak for themselves and that we should ask them what this veils means for them,
not what it means for us”).
175 Cf. Amy Adler, Performance Anxiety: Medusa, Sex and the First Amendment, 21
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 227, 243-49 (2009) (arguing that Medusa resisted the male gaze
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Before turning to American governmental responses to head veils, it
is important to discuss the European reaction, which has often been
more extreme. For example, in 2004 the French Parliament banned
the wearing of head veils in public schools.176 By its terms, the law
targets all “conspicuous” religious symbols, but the focus of the debate
surrounding the law was on banning Muslim head veils and scarves.177
In discussion leading up to the ban, then-President Jacques Chirac
said that there was “something aggressive” in a head veil and that
“[w]earing a veil, whether we want it or not, is a sort of aggression
that is difficult for us to accept.”178 As with anti-mask laws, head
coverings are interpreted by the state as expressing something
aggressive. They are read as hostile, in part, because they cut off the
ability of the state and dominant society to surveil, to gaze.179 As Joan
Wallach Scott has explained, French cultural imperialism is built in
part on the ability “to know one’s subjects” and part of knowing one’s
subject involves “‘tear[ing] off the veil which still hides the mores,
customs, and ideas’ of Arab society.”180 Put more bluntly by Scott, the

with her own deadly stare, expressing herself and casting herself as a gender outlaw).
176 Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité,
le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles,
collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 Governing, Under the
Principle of Secularism, the Wearing of Symbols or Clothing Denoting Religious
Affiliation in Schools, Colleges and Public High Schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], March 17, 2004, p. 5190.
177 See SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL, supra note 170, at 151-56.
178 John Henley, Something Aggressive About Veils, Says Chirac, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2003,
9:21 PM EST), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/06/france.jonhenley; see also
ALLEN, supra note 172, at 53 (recounting an incident where a retired French school teacher
ripped the veil off a Muslim woman in a retail store because “wearing the veil is an act of
aggression”).
179 Cf. TIMOTHY MITCHELL, COLONISING EGYPT 33 (1988) (describing the importance
of observation and ordering to the colonial enterprise); Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun, The
Issue of the Islamic Headscarf, in WOMEN, IMMIGRATION AND IDENTITIES IN FRANCE 77
(Jane Freedman & Carrie Tarr eds., 2000) (quoting one Algerian Muslim women as
explaining that: “In covering my body, I present myself in such a way that men are
only interested in my character and my behavior, in short they consider me as a
human being. In freeing myself from the male gaze I affirm my liberty.”); EL GIUNDI,
supra note 169, at 23 (“The Euro-Christian gaze at Muslim culture . . . has been a gaze
of violence, dominance, distortion and belittlement”).
180 SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL, supra note 170, at 49 (citing Julia Clancy-Smith, La
Femme Arabe: Women and Sexuality in France’s Northern African Empire, in AMIRA EL
AZHARY SONBOL, ed., WOMEN, THE FAMILY, AND DIVORCE LAWS IN ISLAMIC HISTORY 56
(Syracuse, N.Y. Syracuse University Press, 1996).
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veil is “an impenetrable membrane, the final barrier to political
subjugation.”181
Not content with banning head veils in public schools, in 2010
France banned the wearing of full-face veils — including niqabs and
burkas — in public places.182 The French ban was upheld by the
European Court of Human Rights in 2014.183 In justifying the ban, the
ECHR specifically relied on the French government’s argument that
head veils interfered with people’s ability to “live together” because it
limited social interaction.184 In other words, the court viewed people’s
ability to surveil and observe one another in public as a key
constitutional value. As Judith Butler has argued, veil restrictions
“condition the entrance to the public sphere” on a compulsory
disaffiliation with one’s religion and, I would add, a surrender of one’s
privacy.185 Public space, rather than being a place where people are
able to come and engage in the market place of ideas on their own
terms, is instead a site where they are stripped and exposed to
surveillance.186 In short, while the French government’s motivation for
such laws is complex, touching on issues of race, religion,
immigration, and sexuality, the laws are part of a history of attempting
to surveil and observe Muslim bodies.
But France is not alone in its efforts to surveil Muslim communities
generally, nor in its attempts to force women to remove their head
coverings specifically.187 The veil has also been targeted in the United
181 Id. at 67. The reality of the gendered surveillance gaze is amplified by the fact
that though certain surveillance regimes, such as CCTV cameras, are sometimes
justified as a means of protecting women from harassment, surveillance cameras can
just as plausibly serve as a means of harassment by peeping toms. See Hille Koskela,
Video Surveillance, Gender, and the Safety of Public Urban Space: “Peeping Tom” Goes
High Tech?, 23 URB. GEOGRAPHY, 257, 264 (2002).
182 See Loi 2010-1192 du 10 Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage
dans l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 10, 2010 on prohibiting concealment
of the face in the public space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 7, 2010.
183 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 59-60 (2014).
184 Id. at 55.
185 BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 82.
186 EL GIUNDI, supra note 169, at 77-82 (explaining how, in certain contexts, Arab
conceptions of privacy are relational and public and that the veil can help negotiate
boundaries within public space).
187 Other European countries, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, have also
restricted face coverings in public spaces. See Alice Foster, Where in the World Are the Burka
and Niqab Banned?, EXPRESS (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/
652842/Burka-Niqab-Islamic-Face-veil-Ban-UK-Fine-France-Belgium-Netherlands-EuropeMuslim-dress.
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States, albeit to a lesser degree.188 For example, law enforcement
agencies such as the New York Police Department have created
specific initiatives targeting Muslim communities for surveillance.189
The legality of such programs is currently being challenged in federal
court.190 These programs have had a specific effect on those who
would otherwise wear a head or full-body covering. A report co-led by
three non-governmental organizations documented how the NYPD’s
surveillance program was causing Muslim individuals to avoid wearing
clothes, including head coverings, that might identify them as Muslim
out of fear that such clothing would draw law enforcement
suspicion.191 Such fear is no surprise given that a 2007 NYPD report
on its theory of Muslim radicalization suggested that one “typical
signature” of radicalization was the wearing of traditional Islamic
clothing.192 The NYPD has viewed head coverings as expressing
something dangerous, and has responded to that expression with
additional surveillance and targeting by law enforcement.
Of course, there may also be discriminatory racial and religious
motivations for such laws. But part of what colors Western society’s
view that head veils are rhetorically aggressive is that it prevents the
state and its agents from observing and surveilling Muslim women’s

188 Cf. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, The Post 9/11 “Hijab” as Icon, 68 SOC. OF RELIGION
253, 263 (2007) (explaining that “in an America traumatized by 9/11, many
Americans began to identify the hijab as the standard of the enemy”).
189 Hassan v. City of N.Y., 804 F.3d 277, 285 (3d Cir. 2015) (outlining alleged
scope of NYPD’s Muslim surveillance program, which includes video monitoring
mosques and those who enter and exit those mosques and embedding undercover
officers in Muslim community organizations, among other tactics).
190 See id.; see also Matthew A. Wasserman, Note, First Amendment Limitations on
Police Surveillance: The Case of the Muslim Surveillance Program, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1786, 1821-23 (2015) (arguing that the surveillance program chills expressive
behavior in violation of the First Amendment).
191 MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL. ET AL., MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND
ITS IMPACT ON MUSLIM AMERICANS 15-16 (2013) (“Almost all our interviewees noted
that appearing Muslim, or appearing to be a certain type of Muslim, invites unwanted
attention or surveillance from law enforcement. Outward displays of Muslim identity
could include the choice to wear the hijab (headscarf), the niqab (full covering), grow
a beard, or dress in certain kinds of traditional or Islamic clothing. That surveillance
should focus on such details results from the NYPD’s radicalization theory, which
posits that decisions about dress or appearance are no longer just signifiers of
personal, religious choices or cultural identities but rather serve as indicators of
‘dangerousness.’”).
192 MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,
RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 31 (2007), http://sethgodin.
typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.
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bodies.193 Indeed, in the aftermath of the attacks by members/
sympathizers of the Islamic State in Paris and San Bernardino in the
fall of 2015, there was an uptick in targeting of women wearing head
veils in the United States194 — even when the veils were being worn by
people out of sympathy with Muslim women rather than any
independent personal conviction.195
One may be inclined to believe that America’s protections for
religious freedom are enough to provide Muslims with the legal rights
they need to wear a head covering, and that conceptualizing head veils
as acts of performative privacy is redundant. That would be a mistake.
The U.S. Constitution and statutory protections such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act and Religious Freedom Restoration Acts extend
formal protections for religious free exercise.196 But, in practice, those
purported safeguards fail to fully protect Muslim individuals’ ability to
wear religious apparel or fully embrace Muslim grooming
requirements. For example, in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. GEO Group Inc., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a private company that ran a Pennsylvania correctional
facility was entitled to summary judgment in a claim by a class of
female Muslim employees notwithstanding that the company refused
to allow the women to wear head coverings, called khimars, to
work.197 While the employer purported to ban head coverings of all
kinds, including hats, for security and contraband purposes, evidence
suggested that the policy was inconsistently applied and that certain
hats were, in fact, permitted notwithstanding security concerns.198 The
safety rationale was further undermined by evidence suggesting that

193

See SCOTT, POLITICS OF THE VEIL, supra note 170, at 49.
Eric Lichtblau, Crimes Against Muslim Americans and Mosques Rise Sharply, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/us/politics/crimes-againstmuslim-americans-and-mosques-rise-sharply.html (noting that hate crimes against
Muslims, including hijab-wearing students, had tripled in the wake of attacks in Paris
and San Bernardino).
195 See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Wheaton College Professor Is Put on Leave After Remarks
on Islam, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/us/wheatoncollege-professor-larycia-hawkins-muslim-scarf.html (documenting suspension of
professor who wore head veil in solidarity with Muslims).
196 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); see also Scott
Thompson, House of Wisdom or a House of Cards? Why Teaching Islam in U.S. Foreign
Detention Facilities Violates the Establishment Clause, 88 NEB. L. REV. 341, 346 (2009)
(outlining the religion clause).
197 EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 277 (3d Cir. 2010).
198 Id. at 286 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
194
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the employer made little effort to enforce the policy until it became
aware of a request by an employee to wear her khimar.199
There are several other examples of courts failing to protect
women’s ability to wear Muslim head coverings notwithstanding the
existence of laws protecting religious expression.200 As Robson has
summarized, such cases “belie simplistic [and I would add
widespread] assumptions that the First Amendment’s religious
protections prevent prohibitions of women wearing the hijab or
niqab.”201 Instead, the religious protection that ought to be afforded to
such head coverings is often subverted in the courts.202
There is therefore space for the concept of performative privacy to
help advance the doctrinal protections for head veils. To be certain,
often legal protections for identity-based claims are only enforced
when that claim is coupled or linked with a non-identity-based
claim.203 The recent Supreme Court decisions in United States v.
Windsor204 and Obergefell v. Hodges205 help highlight this point. In
both cases, the Supreme Court relied on equal protection and
substantive due process principles to protect the rights of same-sex
couples to marry.206 Thus, in ways similar to hoodies, the state reads
199

See id. (Tashima, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming
grant of summary judgment for defendant City of Philadelphia notwithstanding its
refusal to permit plaintiff employee to wear her Muslim headscarf); United States v.
Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 891 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusal to permit substitute teacher to
teach in Muslim full body covering did not violate Title VII); Muhammad v. Paruk,
553 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (denying woman relief when she was
required to remove face veil in order to testify in her own lawsuit); Freeman v. Dep’t
of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48, 57 (Fla. App. 2006) (Florida’s
Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not forbid state from requiring Muslim woman
to remove face veil for driver’s license photo).
201 ROBSON, supra note 109, at 151.
202 But see EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2037
(2015) (denying employer summary judgment in Title VII employment discrimination
where employer refused to hire Muslim applicant because her headscarf would violate
the employer’s dress code).
203 Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748-50
(2011) (observing that “constitutional equality and liberty claims are often
intertwined” and that liberty themes may find broader acceptance with the Supreme
Court).
204 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
205 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
206 In Windsor, the Court also used federalism principles to bolster its holding. See,
e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in
Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 87, 144 (2014) (documenting the use of federalism to as
“an enabling device” for the protection of individual rights).
200
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the veil as an aggressive form of resistance to its surveillance efforts
and targets the veil for specific sanction, highlighting the ways in
which a veil does, in fact, sometimes serve as a form of performative
privacy and expression against those surveillance regimes.
To conclude, post-structural performativity theory suggests that
societal structures can imbue certain functional acts with expressive
meaning in relation to those social structures. In the context of public
privacy, the widespread surveillance regimes now in place help steep
individual efforts to maintain privacy with expressive value — the
functional wearing of a hoodie, utilization of Tor, or refusal to comply
with laws designed to out one’s birth-assigned gender are not
normatively neutral acts. They are replete with meaning and often
express opposition to the widespread attempts by surveillance regimes
to eradicate privacy while in public. As this Part suggested, evidence of
performative privacy’s salience comes not just from theory, but also
from the state’s reaction to functional efforts to maintain privacy. In
the final Part, I discuss the doctrinal and discursive implications for
conceiving of efforts to maintain privacy in this way; for
understanding acts of public privacy as performative and expressive.
III. PERFORMATIVE PRIVACY’S POWER
Part III turns to the implications, or payoffs, of a theory of
performative privacy. First, identification of performative privacy as a
conceptual theory of public privacy may help bring acts of public
privacy within the First Amendment’s doctrinal ambit, avoiding
current barriers posed by the secrecy paradigm. Second, performative
privacy may help redraw the line between public and private, helping
positively frame acts of public privacy, and discursively shaping public
attitudes towards attempts to obtain privacy in public (and the social
controversies that are often closely tied to such attempts).
A. Doctrinal Implications
The First Amendment provides robust protections for freedom of
expression. That protection extends to what has been dubbed
“expressive conduct” and “symbolic speech,” and is not limited to socalled “pure speech.”207 To be clear, I am not suggesting that all
regulation of acts of performative privacy are necessarily contentbased and would fail under the First Amendment. My objectives with
207 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (holding that flag
burning is conduct protected by the First Amendment).
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regard to doctrine are more modest — to show that the concept of
performative privacy helps us understand how acts of public privacy
are expressive and, therefore, how the First Amendment might cover
and provide meaningful protection for acts of public privacy.
Generally, the test applied to determine whether government action
unconstitutionally infringes on expressive conduct or symbolic speech
is the same as that applied to “pure” speech.208 If the government
regulation at issue is content-based (that is, targeted toward a
particular subject matter or message), it is subject to strict scrutiny
and often found to be unconstitutional.209 However, as the Court held
in United States v. O’Brien, the government may impose contentneutral time, place and manner restrictions on expressive conduct so
long as those restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest and leave open ample alternative channels for
communication.210
But more crucial for present purposes is whether acts of
performative privacy could satisfy the initial hurdle — that is, whether
they could be classified as expressive.211 An analysis of Supreme Court
208 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment
generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct,
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of
Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 33 (1973) (“Any
attempt to disentangle ‘speech’ from conduct which is itself communicative will not
withstand analysis. The speech element in symbolic speech is entitled to no lesser
(and also no greater) degree of protection than that accorded to so-called pure speech.
Indeed, in one sense all speech is symbolic.”).
209 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S 443, 457-58 (2011) (holding that Westboro
Baptist’s political speech outside of a funeral was entitled to “special protection”
against content-based tort regulation of that speech); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“[T]he First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.”); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (“Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid.”).
210 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to regulation which had incidental impact on expressive conduct); see also
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27 (2010) (noting that if a generally applicable law is directed
at an individual because of their expressive conduct, the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny
standard will not apply).
211 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66
(2006) (determining whether the conduct was, in fact, expressive before applying the
O’Brien level of scrutiny); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 (noting that the first step is to
determine if the conduct is expressive and, if so, then determine whether strict
scrutiny or the more relaxed O’Brien standard applies); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The
First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 772 (2001) (“As the Supreme Court
has reemphasized in subsequent cases such as Texas v. Johnson, a flag-burning
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jurisprudence scrutinizing whether a particular act is expressive
conduct — whether it is “speech” — and thus entitled to First
Amendment protections, demonstrates that many of the acts of
performative privacy outlined above ought to be protected against
government incursion by the First Amendment.212
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., the Supreme Court articulated in detail the close
relationship between conduct that is also communicative and the right
to free expression.213 In that case, the Court considered whether the
private organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade could be forced by a
local non-discrimination ordinance to include a gay, lesbian, and
bisexual organization in the parade or whether the forced inclusion
violated the parade organizers’ First Amendment rights. The Court
analyzed whether the parade, while certainly involving conduct, was
also a form of expression. The Court rather easily concluded that
parades are “a form of expression, not just motion,” notwithstanding
that they involve a large degree of conduct — marching, waving, sign
holding.214 The Court explained that “[t]he protected expression that
inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and songs, however,
for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as
mediums of expression.”215 The Court reiterated that “symbolism is a
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.”216
Importantly, as others such as Stuart Benjamin have observed,217 in
Hurley, the Court defined the kinds of conduct entitled to First
Amendment protection expansively, holding that “a narrow,
decision, the O’Brien test is not triggered — indeed no First Amendment scrutiny is
triggered — if the defendant was not engaged in ‘expressive conduct.’”).
212 Again, my purpose here is not to methodically determine whether each of the
regulations discussed in Part II is content-based or content-neutral, thereby
determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, strict or intermediate. Both forms of
scrutiny are relatively robust, requiring either compelling or substantial government
interests and narrowly tailored regulations, and are certainly more robust than the
weak protections provided by the Fourth Amendment discussed in Part I. Rather, it is
to show how acts of performative privacy could be considered expressive conduct,
implicating First Amendment scrutiny in the first instance.
213 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 568-70 (1995).
214 Id. at 568.
215 Id. at 569.
216 Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)).
217 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445,
1464 (2013) (noting that the Supreme Court has, on many occasions, protected
communication that does not express a clear viewpoint and that Hurley seemed to
reject the “particularized message” requirement).
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succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection” and that the expression need not convey a particularized
message.218 In fact, the Court noted that mere participation in the
parade was expressive.219 By emphasizing that no particularized
message need be communicated by the conduct, the Hurley opinion
seemed to soften the standard articulated in Spence v. Washington,
where the Court had suggested that affixing a peace symbol to an
American flag was protected speech because “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present.”220
Consistent with its expansive approach to determining whether
conduct counts as protected speech, the Court has protected, to
varying degrees, cross burning,221 flag burning,222 black armbands
worn to express a certain view,223 sit-ins at public libraries,224 nude
dancing and other forms of entertainment,225 among many other
examples.226 Famously, the Court has also held that the expenditure of
218

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
See id. at 570.
220 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974); see also Condon v. Wolfe,
310 Fed. App’x. 807, 819 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court subsequently
minimized the ‘particularized message’ requirement.”); Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d
1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Supreme Court liberalized the standard
and therefore that “in determining whether conduct is expressive, we ask whether the
reasonable person would interpret it as some sort of message, not whether an observer
would necessarily infer a specific message.”); cf. Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the
Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First Amendment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1423,
1423 (2014) (suggesting that even speech deemed “nonsense” may be entitled to First
Amendment protections).
221 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
222 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (holding that the American
flag is “[p]regnant with expressive content” and that the government may not
“proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements”).
223 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969)
(holding that wearing of armbands to protest Vietnam War “was closely akin to ‘pure
speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under
the First Amendment.”).
224 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (“As this Court has repeatedly
stated, [First Amendment] rights are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace
appropriate types of action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and
orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the
protestant has every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities.”).
225 See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); see also City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 302 (2000) (O’Connor, J., plurality)
(concluding that nude dancing is expressive conduct but that ban on public nudity
survived O’Brien intermediate scrutiny).
226 Cf. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding fist in
air during pledge of allegiance was expressive conduct and possibly even pure
219
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money in political campaigns, while sometimes containing an element
of conduct, is protected First Amendment speech.227
Within the specific context of clothing, relevant to multiple
examples of performative privacy, “[a]ttire bearing words or symbols
is much more likely to meet the expressive threshold necessary to
invoke First Amendment protections . . . [but] even unadorned
apparel can speak volumes.”228 And while First Amendment
challenges to regulation of people wearing saggy pants for indecent
exposure, disorderly conduct, or violation of dress codes have met
with mixed results (often because it is not clear if a message is being
communicated229 or that the message is understood230), the concept of
performative privacy helps give shape and contour to the message
conveyed by hoodies, head veils, and the like — a political message of
resistance to surveillance.
That is, to the extent the Spence “particularized message”
requirement does survive Hurley, performative privacy helps
distinguish hoodies and head veils from other kinds of apparel (such
as saggy pants) that have not received consistent First Amendment
protection.

speech); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1063 (3d ed. 2006) (listing several examples of symbolic speech); Genevieve Lakier,
Sport as Speech, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1109, 1111 (2014) (arguing that spectator sports
are expressive and entitled to First Amendment coverage). But see Zalewska v. Cty. of
Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a woman who wore a skirt
when dress code required that she wear pants was not protected by First Amendment
because message she sought to convey was not particularized or easily comprehensible
by others).
227 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“Some forms of communication
made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some
involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two.”); cf. Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
228 ROBSON, supra note 109, at 110; see also Onika K. Williams, Note, The
Suppression of a Saggin’ Expression: Exploring the “Saggy Pants” Style Within a First
Amendment Context, 85 IND. L.J. 1169, 1173 (2010) (explaining that “[b]ecause the
saggy-pants style communicates a message of fashionable disobedience . . . wearing
saggy pants is an expressive form of conduct through which the style assures
individual self-fulfillment in a democratic society, that saggy pants are a form of
communication, and that the saggy-pants style satisfies the expressive-conduct test of
Spence v. Washington”).
229 ROBSON, supra note 109, at 121.
230 Bivens ex rel. Green v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D.N.M.
1995) (finding “that Plaintiff’s subjective message supposedly conveyed by wearing
saggy pants is by no means apparent to those who view it”).
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Similarly, with regard to the requirement, also from Spence, that the
audience be able to “understand” the message,231 the government
does, indeed, understand that efforts to functionally resist surveillance
by wearing a hoodie or head veil are expressing a message of resistance
to surveillance, deems that particular message as one of resistance or
intimidation, and responds with regulation, as outlined in Part II.232
Furthermore, acts of performative privacy are unlike the conduct
involved in cases such as Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights.233 There, the Supreme Court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to the Solomon Amendment, which required
educational institutions to permit military recruitment on campus,
because the conduct at issue (refusal to permit recruiters) only gained
expressive meaning when accompanied by speech.234 Acts of
performative privacy are more intrinsically expressive even when
unaccompanied by separate speech because of the context or
structures of surveillance. That is, like the wearing of black arm bands
in Tinker v. Des Moines,235 which only became expressive in the social
context of the Vietnam War, acts of performative privacy are imbued
with expression because of the social context of widespread
surveillance. In fact, Spence, too, emphasizes the importance of
“surrounding circumstances” to the determination of whether conduct
is understood as expressive.236 Similarly, as Jocelyn Simonson has
artfully explained, “by visibly challenging authority, the action of
filming police officers in public is an expression of dissent,” separate
and apart from any First Amendment activity the filming may
facilitate.237 It is the “in-the-moment” context of filming police activity
or abuse (or, as I argue, demanding privacy) that helps provide that
conduct its expressive meaning.
In sum, in the same way that conduct can be audibly silent and yet
protected expression, merely because some conduct may involve an
aspect of actual, oral communication, does not dictate that the

231

See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).
See supra Part II.B (discussing enforcement of anti-mask laws where hoodies are
deemed intimidating).
233 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).
234 See id.
235 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
236 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 411; cf. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (noting the importance of “contextual factors” to
determining expressive conduct’s meaning).
237 Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the
Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1573 (2016).
232
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communication is protected by the First Amendment, as explained in
Rumsfeld.238 The use of words is not the lynchpin, one way or another,
in determining whether the First Amendment applies.239 Speech is not
the sine qua non of expression.
That said, reinforcing the view that functional demands for privacy
may also be viewed as legally-protected speech — as expressive — is
the Supreme Court’s broad view of what types of information, or data,
counts as protected expression. There is a growing body of law
recognizing that mere transmission of facts, or data, can communicate
and that, in certain situations (but not necessarily always), the
transmission of data ought to be entitled to First Amendment
protections.240 There is also authority concluding that computer code
itself is protected speech.241 And others have documented authority
suggesting that algorithm-based search engine results might also be
entitled to First Amendment protection.242
238 547 U.S. at 66; see e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229-30 (9th Cir.
2014) (holding that a law banning the provision of gay conversion therapy to minors
by state-licensed mental health professionals regulated conduct, not protected speech,
even though communication was involved), cert. denied, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4636.
239 As Erwin Chemerinsky has explained: “To deny First Amendment protection
for [symbolic] forms of communication would mean a loss of some of the most
effective means of communicative messages. Also, words are obviously symbols, and
there is no reason why the First Amendment should be limited to protecting just these
symbols to the exclusion of all others.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 226, at 1063; cf.
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992) (“Where the government does not target
conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation
merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.”); BUTLER, ASSEMBLY,
supra note 66, at 18 (“[W]e have to rethink the speech act in order to understand
what is made and what is done by certain kinds of bodily enactments: the bodies
assembled ‘say’ we are not disposable, even if they stand silently.”); id. at 45 (“It
cannot be that agency is a specific power of speech, and that the speech act is the
model of political action.”).
240 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 58, 70, 90 (2014)
(explaining that “[d]ata communicates,” that one fact is often more persuasive than
thousands of opinions, and that focusing on the government’s intent or motive for
regulating a particular piece of data will shed light on whether the data is entitled to
First Amendment protections).
241 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449 (2d Cir.
2001) (concluding that computer code can warrant First Amendment protection).
242 See Benjamin, supra note 217, at 1458-71 (collecting Supreme Court authority
suggesting that algorithm-based search engine results were protected speech); cf.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (concluding that video
games are protected by the First Amendment). For a contrasting view as to whether
computer-generated communications are entitled to First Amendment coverage, see
Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013) (arguing that when
data is operating merely as a functional communication tool or conduit, as opposed to

2017]

Performative Privacy

1727

Moreover — and particularly relevant to efforts to obfuscate online
activity, which sometime involve supplying inaccurate information —
the Supreme Court recently suggested in United States v. Alvarez that
even false speech is entitled to First Amendment protections.243 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the Stolen Valor Act, which
criminalized false claims about having a military medal, was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.244 The Court specifically
rejected the Government’s contention that “false statements generally
should constitute a new category of unprotected speech” and, instead,
suggested merely that the falsity of a statement could be relevant to
the First Amendment analysis if the speech also fell within one of the
other, less protected categories of speech.245
Acts of performative privacy will often not fall into such categories.
As the Court recounted in Alvarez, categories of less protected speech
include speech inciting imminent lawless action, obscenity,
defamation, fighting words, fraud, true threats, and child
pornography.246 And these categories themselves are narrowly defined
and subject to certain exceptions, which move the speech into the
protected realm.247 Indeed, even when speech is so generally offensive,
such as the speech by Westboro Baptist Church outside the funeral of
a fallen Marine, which included signs such as “Thank God for Dead
Soldiers,” the expression is entitled to robust First Amendment
protections.248
Further, while the Supreme Court has noted a broad number of
goals served by the First Amendment, it has on multiple occasions
emphasized that the First Amendment’s primary goal is the protection
of political speech. As recently as 2011, the Court has held that “[t]he

actually serving to curate content, the data is not “speech” covered by the First
Amendment).
243 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539-40 (2012).
244 See id. at 2543.
245 Id. at 2546-47; see also Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly
Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (2015) (documenting
when lies may be entitled to First Amendment protection); Helen Norton, Lies and the
Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 171-72 (2012) (suggesting that regulation of lies
should be limited by First Amendment interests in limiting the government’s ability to
serve as the ultimate judge of truth).
246 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (collecting authority). For an important critique
of whether the diminished protection provided to so-called low-value speech is
supported by the First Amendment history, see Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of
Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2182-92 (2015).
247 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
248 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S 443, 448, 458 (2011).
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Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public
matters.”249 As Part II demonstrated, acts of performative privacy are
at their heart political in nature — statements of resistance to
surveillance structures.
Nor is it irrelevant to any consideration of the scope of protections
afforded to performative privacy that the Supreme Court has long
protected anonymous speech.250 Significantly, in Watchtower Bible &
Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton, the Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment’s protections for anonymous speech
extended to invalidate an ordinance prohibiting canvassers from going
onto private property to promote any cause unless they had first
received a permit to do so, and the resident had not opted to display a
“no solicitation” sign.251 The Court noted that the registration
requirement “necessarily results in a surrender of anonymity” because
the canvasser is identified in the application, which in turn is available
for public inspection.252 Notwithstanding the fact that a canvasser
known to a resident would “reveal their allegiance to a group or cause
when they present themselves at the front door to advocate an issue or
to deliver a handbill,” canvassers who were “strangers to the resident
certainly maintain their anonymity” absent the registration
requirement.253 The court directly rejected an appeal to infect the First
Amendment with the third-party doctrine.254 It recognized the
importance of practical anonymity when engaged in public expression.

249 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011); see also Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (characterizing political speech as “central to
the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment”); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is ‘at the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect.’” (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365
(2003))); Black, 538 U.S. at 365 (explaining that conduct, including cross burning,
can mean “that the person is engaged in core political speech”).
250 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(“Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield
from the tyranny of the majority.”); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)
(overturning statute restricting the distribution of anonymous pamphlets because
“[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an
important role in the progress of [person]kind” and observing that “[p]ersecuted
groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize
oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all”).
251 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
154, 169 (2002).
252 Id. at 166.
253 Id. at 166-67.
254 See id.
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Even upon entering the public realm to advocate a particular idea, the
Court held that permitting the canvasser to remain anonymous (to the
extent possible) was critical under the First Amendment.255
Accordingly, depending on the context in which they arise, many of
the acts of performative privacy discussed in Part II may be construed
as expressive, political conduct entitled to First Amendment
protections. In the context of the living history of state-sanctioned
violence against black bodies, wearing a hoodie can be an attempt to
maintain public anonymity and a statement of resistance against a
surveilling, violent state. In the context of attempts to force trans
people to publicly disclose intimate information in order to access
public restrooms or participate on public sports teams, demands for
privacy by trans people are performative expressions of their true
gender identity. In the context of state and corporate efforts to strip
Muslim women of their coverings, refusal to do so is not only a
statement of religion, but can also serve as a responsive call for
privacy/modesty in the face of public gaze. In the context of attempts
to identify and intimidate peaceful, lawful protestors, the wearing of
masks is an expressive refusal to succumb to the surveillance state.256
Likewise, in the context of panoptic state and private surveillance of
online activity, attempts to obfuscate cyber activity (in effect, donning
a “cyber mask”) are also performative privacy acts.257
Doctrinally, once these activities are deemed to include expressive
conduct they become subject to the First Amendment’s protection,
meaning that any attempt by the government to regulate the content
of the expression is likely subject to strict scrutiny and any contentneutral time, place, and manner restriction must nevertheless be
255 But see, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194-99 (2010) (recognizing the First
Amendment interest in anonymously petitioning the government for a referendum,
but concluding, as a general matter, that there is no First Amendment violation where
the identity of petition signatories is publicly disclosed because of an overriding
government interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process).
256 But see Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
206-07 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding New York’s anti-mask law against First Amendment
challenge and concluding that KKK’s desire to wear masks was not protected
expressive conduct because it was “redundant” of the rest of the expression conveyed
by the rest of the costume).
257 One may be concerned that requiring courts to determine whether these acts
are entitled to First Amendment protection will require laborious individualized
inquires. And that may be so, but courts are well-accustomed to making such First
Amendment inquiries as it stands. Indeed, in the First Amendment context, even
appellate courts are charged with examining the whole record and often scrutinize
underlying facts as “ultimate” or so-called “constitutional” subject to de novo review.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501, 504-05 (1984).
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narrowly tailored and satisfy intermediate scrutiny.258 This is in
contrast to the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy
inquiry, which often amounts to little more than a balancing test tilted
in favor of the government.259 In Alvarez, the Supreme Court
reiterated its rejection of a balancing test for First Amendment claims,
explaining that “a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . .
[based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits”
would be “startling and dangerous.”260
While case-by-case application of scrutiny is beyond the scope of
this Article, many of the laws targeting acts of performative privacy
would seem to fail such scrutiny.261 For example, bathroom bills that
limit transgender individuals’ ability to express their gender identity
by using the restrooms that correspond to that identity, are often
specifically designed to restrict and punish gender expression.262
Similarly, laws that specifically target hoodies for criminalization
could be considered content-based limitations on the ability to express
opposition to the state’s surveillance regime and the corresponding
structural oppression of racial minorities. Nor is it doctrinally
irrelevant, as then-Professor Elena Kagan pointed out,263 that many of
258

See supra note 210 (discussing level of scrutiny for First Amendment claims).
See Skinner-Thompson, Outing, supra note 29, at 196 n.208 (outlining Fourth
Amendment balancing test).
260 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
261 This is not to say that there may never be legitimate government interests for
regulating acts of public privacy or that law enforcement will be paralyzed. But instead
of the Fourth Amendment’s milquetoast balancing test, those interests should be
substantial or compelling. Nor is it to suggest that expressive conduct can never form
the basis of reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, warranting further police
investigation or arrest. People’s words and expression often function as evidence and
serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion. But the expression must be suggestive of a
crime and, as discussed with regard to Virginia v. Black, ex ante criminalization of
particular communications is unconstitutional. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,
366-67 (2003). And nothing about maintaining one’s privacy — without more — is
suggestive of criminal activity. See Joh, supra note 86, at 1002.
262 See Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060-A, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 491, at *10 (Oct.
11, 2000) (concluding that a transgender female student’s desire to dress in female
clothes was protected expressive conduct likely to be understood by others because
“by dressing in clothing and accessories traditionally associated with the female
gender, she is expressing her identification with that gender” and that the “plaintiff’s
expression is not merely a personal preference but a necessary symbol of her very
identity”).
263 See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (explaining that First
Amendment doctrine “has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of
259
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the attempts to regulate acts of performative privacy suggest that the
government is itself motivated by an illicit attempt to target a
particular message.264 As the Supreme Court just concluded in
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, the First Amendment is implicated when
the government intends to regulate a particular message, even if the
regulated individual intended no such message and was engaged in no
speech.265
Importantly, the protection provided by the First Amendment is also
not limited by the “secrecy paradigm” that would circumscribe
arguments that these laws run afoul of traditional privacy protections.
Village of Stratton makes that very clear.266 A comparison of how a law
infringing on acts of performative privacy might fare under the Fourth
Amendment and First Amendment helps illustrate the importance of
avoiding the secrecy paradigm or third-party doctrine. For instance,
consider a person subject to a bathroom bill requiring that they show
their birth certificate to confirm that they were using the bathroom
corresponding to their birth-assigned sex. If such a person challenged
enforcement of the law under the Fourth Amendment, a court may
conclude that because a transgender individual’s identity as trans was
partially public (because they had shared that information with
friends, or had already been forced to disclose that information by the
government in other contexts), the individual therefore has no
reasonable expectation of privacy. Conversely, under the First
Amendment, individuals’ expressive efforts to resist attempts to surveil
aspects of their anatomy when using a restroom would be protected as
speech notwithstanding that aspects of their identity might be publicly
available and accessible elsewhere.267
improper governmental motives” and that the “doctrine comprises a series of tools to
flush out illicit motives and to invalidate actions infected with them”); see also
Bambauer, supra note 240, at 89 (suggesting that focusing on the motive behind state
action can help shed light on whether data is subject to First Amendment regulation).
264 See supra Part II.B.
265 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016).
266 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
166 (2002); see also Kaminski, supra note 110, at 838 (observing that the Court in
Stratton acknowledges “that anonymity may be contextual rather than absolute”).
267 As noted at several points, it is not this Article’s contention that all functional
efforts to maintain privacy are necessarily expressive. But that point does not severely
limit the doctrinal impact of the concept of performative privacy. Certainly, for those
who do intend something expressive, they will likely be covered by the First
Amendment. But to the extent that a government regulation is overly broad and
regulates expressive and non-expressive conduct, the First Amendment’s overbreadth
doctrine may still limit the regulation and provide privacy protections. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481-82 (2010) (statute criminalizing the
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As such, once conceptualized as acts of performative, expressive
resistance, attempts to maintain privacy in public may fare better
under the First Amendment’s protections for expressive conduct than
under traditional Fourth Amendment privacy protections,268 which
have been severely hamstrung by doctrines such as the third-party
doctrine.269

creation, sale, or purchase of depictions of animal cruelty was overbroad under the
First Amendment).
268 It is worth noting that by embracing the First Amendment as a means of
advancing privacy protections, this Article might be accused of contributing to what
some, such as Paul Carrington, have dubbed the “imperial First Amendment.” See
Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167, 1209-10
(2001). And to what others have deemed First Amendment Lochnerism, whereby the
First Amendment is used to strike down otherwise valid and commonplace
government regulations. See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner:
Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 433, 457 (2006)
(outlining purported regulatory risks associated with so-called “First Amendment
Lochnerism,” but concluding that the phrase cuts off discussion). While sensitive to
this concern, my sense is that the concept of performative privacy is much more
modest in its formulation of what constitutes protected “speech” than say, for
example, cases which identify pure data as speech or corporations as speakers. In
short, while wary of an imperial First Amendment, the concept of performative
privacy does not dramatically expand doctrine. Instead, performative privacy fits more
squarely with traditional notions of expressive conduct, as outlined in this Part.
Relatedly, there may be concern that this Article’s structural relationship approach
to expression unwittingly buttresses expression-based defenses to LGBT antidiscrimination ordinances by, for example, wedding photographers or florists, who
argue that by being forced to participate in gay weddings they are being compelled to
express a particular view. But there are important differences. First, it is unclear that
taking photographs or baking a cake compels embrace of any message, unlike Hurley
and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2010), where groups
purportedly dedicated to an expressive association were implicated. See Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 65-66 (N.M. 2013) (“The United States
Supreme Court has never found a compelled-speech violation arising from the
application of antidiscrimination laws to a for-profit public accommodation.”).
Second, the compelling government interest of ensuring LGBT equality likely
outweighs any purported speech interest, even assuming it exists. See Erwin
Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 595, 596 (2001) (arguing that Dale was flawed, in part, because it failed to
recognize the compelling interest in achieving equality and because it took an overly
narrow view of the Scouts’ expressive message).
269 While less direct, the concept of performative privacy also has doctrinal
implications for tort law which could be used to limit corporate surveillance. As
discussed in Part I.A, tort claims for invasion of privacy against a private corporation
are hampered by the secrecy paradigm/third-party doctrine. But to the extent
performative privacy helps change societal norms regarding what is reasonably
regarded as private, it can increase the sphere of protected space deemed “private”
under tort jurisprudence.
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B. Discursive Implications
In addition to providing stronger doctrinal protections for public
privacy demands, conceptualizing acts of public privacy as expressive
also has the potential to help alter how efforts to maintain public
privacy are perceived by American society. I analyze several potential
discursive, societal benefits to understanding privacy as performative/
expressive.
1.

From Suspicion to Embrace

As it stands, certain privacy-supplementing acts, such as wearing a
hoodie, head veil, mask, or demanding gender privacy, are viewed
with suspicion. As outlined in Part II.B, there are examples of laws,
policies, or bills specifically targeting each of these activities,270
reflecting at least some level of discomfort with these practices by
certain portions of the populace.
But while many view acts of public privacy as suspicious —
influenced by the inaccurate adage that those who seek privacy have
something to hide271 — freedom of expression maintains broad and
deep support among the American public.272 In fact, in a 2013 survey,
nearly half (47%) of those surveyed identified freedom of speech as
the single most important freedom citizens enjoy.273 The runner-up —
freedom of religion — was selected by only 10% of those surveyed.274
As such, there is reason to believe that if acts of public privacy are
270 See, e.g., H.B. 663, 2016 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (“Local school
boards shall develop and implement policies that require every school restroom,
locker room, or shower room that is designated for use by a specific gender to solely
be used by individuals whose anatomical sex matches such gender designation.”).
271 For example, in 2009, Google CEO Eric Schmidt remarked that “[i]f you have
something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in
the first place.” Richard Esguerra, Google CEO Eric Schmidt Dismisses the Importance of
Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2009/12/google-ceo-eric-schmidt-dismisses-privacy (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
272 See, e.g., FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 2014 (2014),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/State-ofthe-First-Amendment-2014-report-06-24-14.pdf (reflecting that relatively consistently
since 1997 a large majority of Americans express support for the First Amendment,
with most disagreeing that the First Amendment goes too far in protecting rights
(though in recent years, the number of those agreeing that the First Amendment goes
too far has increased)).
273 FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 2013 2 (2013),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/SOFA2013-final-report.pdf.
274 Id.
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framed less as defensive efforts for secrecy, and more as affirmative
acts of expression, they may be viewed more receptively by American
society.
Changing social attitudes towards acts of public privacy may be just
as important for providing doctrinal protections for those acts and
could go a long way in reducing societal violence against those
engaged in acts of public privacy. In other words, if a hoodie is viewed
as an exercise of the cherished right to expression rather than a
defensive attempt at concealment, law enforcement officials and
private individuals alike may hesitate before engaging in violence and
aggression against those who wear a hoodie. As a concept,
performative privacy could help change the starting point for any
conversation regarding public privacy from one of suspicion to one of
sympathy or even embrace. As others have explained, “[h]ow we name
[a] struggle seems to matter very much, given that sometimes a
movement is deemed antidemocratic, even terrorist, and on other
occasions or in other contexts, the same movement is understood as a
popular effort to realize a more inclusive and substantive
democracy.”275 The same holds true for efforts to maintain privacy.
Privacy has been deemed suspicious — but it could be understood as
the expressive articulation of a desire to be free.276
2.

From Inward to Outward

Equally important, even when demands for privacy are not viewed
as raising a red flag of suspicion and are viewed “positively,” privacy
has nevertheless been critiqued as inward-looking, conservative, and
potentially self-oppressive. For example, framing women’s abortion
rights277 or rights to contraception278 as rights to privacy has been
critiqued as rhetorically reinforcing Victorian values that relegate
women to the private sphere — the home — which, in turn, is often a
275

BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 2.
See COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note 11, at 125 (“The way
that we talk about privacy shapes our understanding of what it is — and what it is
not.”); Woodrow Hartzog, The Fight to Frame Privacy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 102126 (2013) (reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011) and highlighting that how privacy is framed
influences how its viewed by audiences).
277 E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson et al.,
Marriage, Abortion, and Coming Out, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 126, 148 (2016)
(observing that “respect for women’s reproductive choices, like respect for consensual
same-sex sexual relations, is rooted in respect for decisional privacy”).
278 E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
276
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site of oppression and even violence against women.279 Similarly,
efforts to advance lesbian and gay rights through a privacy lens280 have
been questioned as suggesting that there is something shameful about
non-heteronormative sexual identities.281 From this perspective,
privacy has been criticized as a demand to remain in the “closet.”282
Broadly speaking, demands for privacy rights often appear inward
looking or pre-political.283 And even those that advance public privacy
with reliance on its instrumental benefits feed into the notion that
privacy is, in fact, inward looking and pre-political, serving merely as
an incubator for later public thought.284
Performative privacy alters the conceptual landscape and helps us
understand that efforts to maintain privacy — refusals of the
surveillance gaze — are in fact outward facing political acts that are
public exercises of an individual’s agency.285 Privacy does not simply
279 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law,
100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) (“The problem is that while the private has been a
refuge for some, it has been a hellhole for others, often at the same time. In gendered
light, the law’s privacy is a sphere of sanctified isolation, impunity, and
unaccountability.”).
280 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 567 (2003) (holding a Texas
statute forbidding same-sex sexual conduct unconstitutional because adults are free to
engage in “private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
281 See generally Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM L. REV.
1431, 1455 (1992) (suggesting that the problem with privacy as a foundation for
lesbian and gay rights is, in part, that the closet is “less a refuge than a prisonhouse”
that helps perpetuate heterosexual privilege).
282 See, e.g., Cathy A. Harris, Note, Outing Privacy Litigation: Toward a Contextual
Strategy for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 248, 265 (1997) (arguing
that “[t]he implication [of privacy protections for one’s sexuality] is that gay and
lesbian sexuality must be shrouded in a secrecy/privacy veil, and that disclosure of
one’s aberrant sexuality by a third party is a legal harm that warrants a legal
remedy”). But see, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT
Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 1764 (2010) (observing that as long as intolerance
against LGBT individuals persists, privacy rights will remain an important protection
for non-normative sexualities).
283 Cf. BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 206 (questioning whether the fact that
the “private sphere becomes the very background of public action” suggests
necessarily that it should “for that reason be cast as prepolitical”).
284 See, e.g., Richards, Dangers, supra note 51, at 1945-46 (“Intellectual-privacy
theory suggests that new ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of
public exposure.”).
285 Cf. Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
303, 308 (2010) (stating that the Fourth Amendment “protects a political ‘right of the
people’ to organize community life free from pervasive government surveillance and
interference”).
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serve as an incubator, creating space for subsequent political
expression (though it does do that). It is more than just a passive
virtue — it is frequently an exercise and expression of power. Privacy
is not pre-political — it is political.286 In this way, the concept of
performative privacy can also help turn the First Amendment into a
sword for privacy rights; whereas currently the First Amendment is
often used to limit regulatory enforcement of privacy under the belief
that limiting the exchange of (private) information is limiting the
exchange of speech.287
When a transgender person refuses to show their “papers” in order
to access the bathroom that corresponds with their true gender
identity, they are not hiding in the closet, but instead are expressing a
political message and living their agency.288 The same holds true for
those who use encryption or wear a hoodie to subvert public
surveillance.289 And this discursive implication — this way of thinking
286 Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 783-84 (1989)
(arguing that, at least in the abortion context, privacy should be viewed as curtailing
the state’s authority to mandate conformity rather than as cabining areas where the
government may not restrict our activity). Relatedly, by understanding that privacy
demands are outward facing and not merely pre-political, the concept of performative
privacy can help destabilize gendered conceptions of privacy as “feminine” and,
correspondingly, of “feminine” as inward and passive. Cf. Rich, supra note 99, at
1047-49 (noting that police surveillance is understood and socialized as a form of
white masculinity and domination).
287 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1049, 1051-52 (2000) (arguing that First Amendment doctrine makes it difficult
to stop dissemination of private information and that efforts to change this would
have unfortunate consequences); cf. AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW
PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015) (making a similar argument
with regard to privacy and the freedom of the press).
288 Significantly, while certain acts of performative privacy may rely on the act of
obfuscation being visible, at the same time they refuse the regulatory regime’s power
to recognize, or constitute, the actor. Cf. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at 4;
see also MCGRATH, supra note 60, at 77 (while advocating for performance critiques of
surveillance, explaining that “we should not fall into the representational trap of
equating value with exposure to view”).
289 To the extent regimes are surveilling for particular purposes — for particular
information — overwhelming self-exposure or inundation can also be a form of
resistance. Kirstie Ball, Exposure, 12 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 639, 653 (2009). Similarly,
the Surveillance Camera Players, who perform plays critical of surveillance regimes in
front of CCTV surveillance cameras, highlight another form of performative resistance
to surveillance regime that is based on being seen — not remaining private. See
MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 137-39 (describing the Surveillance Camera Players and
other forms of counter surveillance resistance as publicly challenging institutional
agents of surveillance); see also MCGRATH, supra note 60, at 208-09 (describing
examples of surveillance performance/critique that are based on creatively flaunting
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about privacy — may, in turn, have doctrinal effects because it can
help both society and the courts better appreciate privacy’s value, the
weight of which is historically underappreciated relative to other
societal concerns (namely, security).290
Relatedly, to the extent that the concept of performative privacy
isolates, labels, and identifies certain arguably quotidian tasks as
privacy-enhancing, it could help shape where we locate the battle lines
between the public and private sphere. As discussed, the state and
corporate actors are continually expanding what is deemed “public”
and therefore subject to regulation. Expanded surveillance erodes
societal expectations of privacy, and expands what is subject to
regulation in the public sphere. Consequently, surveilled “public”
space is no longer for the people, the body politic — but is instead a
space where the state and corporate interests have unchecked control.
Conversely, private space is for the individual, and individuals
collectively, as a public.
What, then, of performative privacy? Performative privacy helps us
understand that efforts are being made to lay claim to purportedly
“public” space by refusing to be surveilled, and keeping that space for
one’s self. It recognizes that efforts are being made to push back the
encroaching front line of the “public” sphere.291
This discursive, conceptual implication, too, has a potential legal
impact, even assuming no change in the conservative, limited
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. Because Fourth
Amendment protections for privacy continue to hinge on where there
is an expectation of privacy society is prepared to recognize as
“reasonable,”292 the concept of performative privacy helps us identify

surveillance). But, in my view, acts of performative privacy are even more powerful
than efforts to ape surveillance because performative privacy acts maintain integrity
and fidelity to the value they are designed to protect — privacy or anonymity —
instead of potentially surrendering one’s identity.
290 See SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 2 (“Privacy often loses out to security when it
shouldn’t. Security interests are readily understood, for life and limb are at stake,
while privacy rights remain more abstract and vague.”).
291 Cf. BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 75 (describing how public occupation
efforts “exercise the performative power to lay claim to the public”); see also Scott
Skinner-Thompson, The Right to the Public Square: Hoodies, Head Veils & Bathrooms,
MUFTAH (Mar. 23, 2017), http://muftah.org/right-public-square-hoodies-head-veilsbathrooms/ (discussing the relationship between public privacy and participatory
democracy).
292 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(concluding that an individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in an
enclosed telephone booth).
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certain acts as privacy-enhancing, as laying claim to certain spaces as
“private,” and, therefore, reasonably entitled to legal protection.293
3.

From Silos to Universality

Finally, to the degree that performative demands for privacy are
made by many marginalized groups including racial, religious, and
sexual minorities, as well as socio-economically marginalized people,
the concept of performative privacy has the potential to serve as a
unifying organizing principle across identity-based movements. This is
not to suggest that movements should not continue to foreground how
discrimination and surveillance are often motivated by engrained
structural animus against minority groups. Nor am I suggesting that
performative privacy could serve as a panacea to all the social
problems afflicting various minority groups, or that minority groups
are the only ones targeted for surveillance. Indeed, as John Gilliom
and others have powerfully demonstrated, socio-economically
depressed groups, including white working people, are subjected to
vast privacy invasions by the government into their homes and
personal lives in return for government benefits.294 And workers of all
stripes are subjected to surveillance by their employers.295 But the
range of those impacted by surveillance underscores how the concept
of performative privacy may foreground how different marginalized
people are all targeted by state and private surveillance regimes (to
differing degrees and in differing ways). This, at the very least could
help such groups recognize the shared aspects of their struggles and,
somewhat more ambitiously, provide a legal/social project around
which to collectively organize. As Butler notes, “identity politics fails
to furnish a broader conception of what it means, politically, to live
together, across differences, sometimes in modes of unchosen
proximity.”296 More particularly, and as an example, Butler has
criticized feminists who support the right of transgender individuals to
appear in public as they desire, but simultaneously supported
293 See Joh, supra note 86, at 1023 (arguing that “privacy protests can demonstrate
the shifting boundaries of privacy norms”).
294 See generally GILLIOM, supra note 55 (examining welfare surveillance regimes
from the perspective of low-income mothers in Appalachia).
295 See, e.g., Karen E.C. Levy, The Contexts of Control: Information, Power, and
Truck-Driving Work, 31 THE INFO. SOC’Y 160 (2015) (documenting industry
surveillance of blue collar truck drivers).
296 BUTLER, ASSEMBLY, supra note 66, at 27; see also id. at 50 (“[T]he struggle to
form alliances is paramount, and it involves a plural and performative positing of
eligibility where it did not exist before.”).
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restrictions on head veils in the name of secular universalism.297 And
while identity-based claims remain of critical importance,
performative privacy helps illustrate a more plural conception of
rights, and how they can be exercised.298
Further, to the extent that identity-based claims tend
(unfortunately) to be viewed skeptically by both American society and
the courts,299 framing issues of targeted surveillance against racial,
religious, and sexual minorities in terms of performative privacy and
freedom of expression has the potential to provide a more universal
and coalescing normative response to these conflicts.
CONCLUSION
In response to aggressive surveillance regimes by the government
and private sector, many individuals engage in acts of performative
privacy — expressive demands for privacy in public that communicate
a refusal to be surveilled. Conceptualizing such functional demands
for public privacy as expressive acts has doctrinal and social
implications. Doctrinally, as expressive conduct, such acts may be
entitled to strict First Amendment protections and be given more
weight relative to the security concerns that often trump privacy’s
indirect benefits — benefits that currently dominate theoretical
conceptions of public privacy’s value. Discursively, linking demands
for privacy with the broadly-supported freedom of expression may
engender societal acceptance of acts of performative privacy, while
also shifting rhetorical norms on the dividing line between public and
private. At the same time, to the extent acts of performative privacy
traverse many different marginalized communities, the concept has
the potential to help us better appreciate the commonality of our
struggles against social structures that maintain control, in part,
through the surveillance of marginalized bodies.

297 See id. at 49-50. This critique is, of course, not isolated at any particular group.
As Torin Monahan and others have observed, the narrow focus of many groups —
including those focused on privacy concerns — has stunted meaningful coalition
building. See MONAHAN, supra note 4, at 143.
298 That said, in order to avoid re-enshrining certain identity categories, efforts at
coalition politics should be open to “an emerging and unpredictable assemblage of
positions,” not assume the content of any particular identity, and leave space for the
annunciation of distinct identity. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 61, at 20.
299 See Yoshino, supra note 203, at 751-55 (noting the pluralism anxiety of
American society and courts and the increased skepticism to claims framed in terms of
group-based identity politics).

